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ABSTRACT 
 Arbitration clauses have become ubiquitous in consumer 
contracts.  These arbitration clauses require consumers to 
waive the constitutional right to a civil jury, access to court, 
and, increasingly, the procedural remedy of class 
representation.  Because those rights cannot be divested 
without consent, the validity of arbitration agreements rests 
on the premise of consent. Consumers who do not want to 
arbitrate or waive their class rights can simply decline to 
purchase the products or services covered by an arbitration 
agreement.  But the premise of consent is undermined if 
consumers do not understand the effect on their procedural 
rights of clicking a box or accepting a product. 
 This Article reports on an empirical study exploring the 
extent to which consumers are aware of and understand the 
effect of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.  We 
conducted an online survey of 668 consumers, approximately 
reflecting the population of adult Americans with respect to 
race/ethnicity, level of education, amount of family income, 
and age.  Respondents were shown a typical credit card 
contract with an arbitration clause containing a class action 
waiver printed in bold and with portions in italics and 
ALLCAPS.  Respondents were then asked questions about the 
sample contract as well as about a hypothetical contract 
containing what was described as a “properly-worded” 
arbitration clause.  Finally, respondents were asked about 
their own experiences with actual consumer contracts. 
 The survey results suggest a profound lack of 
understanding about the existence and effect of arbitration 
agreements among consumers.  While 43% of the 
respondents recognized that the sample contract included an 
arbitration clause, 61% of those believed that consumers 
would, nevertheless, have a right to have a court decide a 
dispute too large for a small claims court.  Less than 9% 
realized that the contract had both an arbitration clause and 
that it would prevent consumers from proceeding in court.  
With respect to the class waiver, four times as many 
respondents thought the contract did not block them from 
participating in a class action as realized that it did, even 
though the class action waiver was printed twice, in bold, in 
the sample contract, including one time in italics and 
ALLCAPS.  Overall, of the more than 5000 answers we 
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recorded to questions offering right and wrong answers, only 
a quarter were correct. 
 Turning to respondents’ own lives, the survey asked if they 
had ever entered into contracts with arbitration clauses.  
Three hundred and three respondents claimed never to have 
done so.  In fact, 264, or 87%, had at least one account 
subject to an arbitration clause. 
 These and other findings reported in this Article should 
cause concern among judges and policymakers considering 
mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration agreements.  
Our results suggest that many citizens assume that they have 
a right to judicial process that they cannot lose as a result of 
their acquiescence in a form consumer contract.  They 
believe that this right to judicial process will outweigh what 
one respondent referred to as a “whimsy little contract.”  
Our results suggest further that citizens are giving up these 
rights unknowingly, either because they do not realize they 
have entered into an arbitration agreement or because they 
do not understand the legal consequences of doing so.  Given 
the degree of misunderstanding the results demonstrate, we 
question whether meaningful consent is possible in the 
consumer arbitration context. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The default mechanism for resolving civil disputes in the United 
States is the court system.  The Federal Constitution, and the 
constitutions of all fifty states and the District of Columbia, guarantee 
a right to a jury trial in civil cases.  Through news stories about lawsuits 
and TV dramas about courtroom lawyers, popular culture conveys the 
message that people with grievances—legitimate or otherwise—can 
and do pursue those grievances through litigation in the court system.  
But parties to civil disputes have the option of waiving their rights to 
adjudicative process by agreeing to have an arbitrator decide their 
disputes.  Under the Federal Arbitration Act, parties can agree by 
contract to arbitrate disputes before those disputes arise, and courts 
must enforce those agreements even if one of the parties wishes to 
proceed in court.1 
Many companies include arbitration clauses in their consumer 
contracts.  Consumers who agree to these contracts waive their rights 
to proceed in court, to a jury trial, and to appeal.  Often, these arbitration 
agreements also provide that the parties waive their right to participate 
                                                          
 1.  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2–4 (2012). 
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in class actions, either in court or in arbitration.  The contracts 
themselves can be quite lengthy. 
The legal regime supporting arbitration—and justifying the waiver 
of constitutionally protected procedural rights implicit in it—rests on 
the principle of consent.  Parties to an arbitration agreement are held to 
their bargain because they have consented to forego the procedural 
rights they would otherwise have.2  Given the complexity of arbitration 
clauses and the burgeoning literature about consumer understanding of 
consumer contracts, however, it is not clear to what extent consumers 
actually know they are agreeing to arbitrate and understand what that 
arbitration agreement entails—a matter that has not been studied until 
now.  If consumers—citizens—are unwittingly being stripped of 
procedural rights that they value and believe they retain, serious 
questions arise about the assumptions underlying the law of arbitration. 
To test consumer awareness and understanding of arbitration in 
consumer contracts, we conducted an online survey of 668 consumers 
using a pool reflecting the demographics of American society as a 
whole.  We displayed a credit card contract with an arbitration clause 
and then asked respondents eight questions about the sample contract 
and an imaginary contract containing a “properly-worded” arbitration 
clause.  Our findings suggest that consumers lack awareness of 
arbitration agreements and do not understand those agreements when 
they are aware of them.  Many expect to have access to the judicial 
system and class actions regardless of what they sign.  To give just two 
examples of the many ways consumers misapprehend arbitration 
agreements, we found that only 43% of the respondents recognized that 
the sample contract included an arbitration clause.  Similarly, less than 
9% realized both that the contract had an arbitration clause and that it 
would prevent consumers from suing in court. 
Even when they were told they entered into enforceable arbitration 
agreements, many respondents did not believe the agreements would be 
enforceable.  For example, even when the question said that the 
arbitrator’s decision was final, far more respondents believed that an 
arbitrator’s decision was not final than thought it was.  Similarly, many 
consumers were not convinced that contract terms would be enforced 
as written.  Thus, when the question stated that they could not 
participate in a class action, more than 70% of the respondents failed to 
realize that they could not. 
Overall, only two respondents, or less than 1%, answered all eight 
questions correctly out of the 663 who responded to all eight, while 117, 
                                                          
 2.  See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 479 (1989) (“Arbitration under the [Federal Arbitration] Act is a matter of con-
sent . . . .”). 
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or 18%, did not answer any of the questions correctly—more than 
answered at least half the questions right.  Respondents gave 44% more 
incorrect answers than correct ones.  Not one of the eight questions 
elicited a majority of correct answers, though on one question a 
majority of the respondents gave wrong answers.3  Put another way, 
almost none of the respondents understood the effect of the arbitration 
clause and many who thought they did were simply wrong. 
These and other findings in the survey raise troubling issues about 
whether consumer consent to arbitration is informed in any sense of the 
word.  These issues, in turn, call into question whether consumers 
should be bound by agreements they cannot comprehend but that strip 
them of constitutional rights. 
The remainder of this Article reports more fully on these and other 
findings.  Part II describes the use of arbitration in consumer contracts.  
Part III reviews previous studies on consumer understanding of 
disclosures and contract terms.  Part IV describes the study 
methodology and the limits to that methodology.  Part V presents and 
analyzes the survey results.  Part VI offers some brief comments on the 
findings.  Part VII concludes. 
II.  THE LANDSCAPE OF ARBITRATION IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS 
A.  The Legal Regime Supporting Arbitration of Consumer 
Disputes 
Arbitration has existed in various forms for centuries.  At the time 
of America’s founding, arbitration was widespread among the colonies, 
often fed by anti-lawyer sentiment.4  Merchants routinely used 
arbitration to avoid the costs and delays of common-law litigation,5 with 
the most important merchants in the colonies making arbitration a key 
function of the New York Chamber of Commerce, formed in 1768.6  
                                                          
 3. Overall, more respondents gave correct answers than incorrect answers on only two 
of the questions.  On two questions the percentage of correct and incorrect answers was 
within the survey’s margin of error.  On four of the questions more respondents gave wrong 
answers than right, sometimes by margins of three or four to one. 
 4. See Carli N. Conklin, Lost Options for Mutual Gain? The Lawyer, the Layperson, 
and Dispute Resolution in Early America, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 581, 583–84 
(2013). 
 5. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee 
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 
70–71 (1997). 
 6. See IMRE SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION 
LAWS IN AMERICA 1718 (2013). 
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Even George Washington famously included a provision in his will 
requiring arbitration of disputes among his heirs.7 
Prior to the twentieth century, however, courts viewed arbitration 
with skepticism, taking the position that an agreement to arbitrate could 
not “oust” a court of its jurisdiction.8  Pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements were widely understood to be revocable at will by either 
party.9  With courts refusing specific enforcement of pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements, a party to an arbitration agreement could, at 
most, sue at law for breach of the agreement.10  But damages were too 
small and speculative for breach of contract to provide a meaningful 
enforcement mechanism, severely curtailing the utility of arbitration 
agreements.11 
In the first decades of the twentieth century, the business 
community, led by the New York Chamber of Commerce, began a 
sustained legislative effort to overcome the judicial hostility to 
arbitration.12  That effort—part of a broader initiative to reform the 
nation’s fragmented and sclerotic system of court procedure13—led first 
to the passage of the New York Arbitration Act and ultimately, in 1925, 
to the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), the statute that 
governs arbitration at both the state and federal level today.14 
                                                          
 7.  See Stephen Wills Murphy, Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: A 
Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 630–31 (2011). 
 8.  See Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C. R. Co., 211 N.Y. 346, 354 (1914) (Cardozo, 
J., concurring) (“If jurisdiction is to be ousted by contract, we must submit to the failure of 
justice that may result from these and like causes.  It is true that some judges have expressed 
the belief that parties ought to be free to contract about such matters as they please.  In this 
state the law has long been settled to the contrary.”); Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 
(1868); Thompson v. Charnock, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1310 (K.B) (“[I]t is not necessary 
now to say how this point ought to be determined if it were res integra, it having been decided 
again and again that an agreement to refer all matters in difference to arbitration is not suffi-
cient to oust the Courts of Law or Equity of their jurisdiction.”); Vynior’s Case, (1609) 77 
Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B.). 
 9.  See Tobey v. Cnty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (Story, 
J.) (“It is certainly the policy of the common law, not to compel men to submit their rights 
and interests to arbitration, or to enforce agreements for such a purpose.  Nay, the common 
law goes farther, and even if a submission has been made to arbitrators, who are named, by 
deed or otherwise, with an express stipulation, that the submission shall be irrevocable, it 
still is revocable and countermandable, by either party, before the award is actually made, 
although not afterwards.”). 
 10.  See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 73–74. 
 11.  Id. at 74. 
 12.  See SZALAI, supra note 6, at 122–31. 
 13.  See Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1939 (2014). 
 14.  See STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 23 (2d 
ed. 2007). 
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The core of the FAA is Section 2, which provides that “a written 
provision . . . in a contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”15  This provision abrogated the 
“revocability” doctrine created by courts that had to that point stymied 
the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  Section 2 is 
given teeth by Sections 3 and 4.  Section 3 requires any federal court to 
stay litigation and refer the parties to arbitration where the subject of a 
lawsuit is covered by an arbitration agreement.16  Section 4 requires 
federal courts to compel arbitration where one party to an arbitration 
agreement has failed to comply with it.17 
For the first half-century of the FAA’s existence, courts 
interpreted it narrowly.  The most prominent example of that 
understanding was the Supreme Court’s 1953 decision in Wilko v. 
Swan,18 in which the Court refused to compel arbitration of claims 
arising under the Securities Act of 1933.  Focusing on the inadequacy 
of arbitration as a substitute for formal adjudication, the Court 
emphasized that the arbitrators would not have a judge to instruct them 
on the law and, even conceding their obligation to apply the law, would 
be under no obligation to produce a reasoned opinion allowing for 
meaningful judicial review. 
Wilko was widely understood to bar the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements involving claims arising under federal statutory law.  Over 
the next three decades, courts repeatedly refused to enforce arbitration 
agreements with respect to statutory claims, including claims arising 
under federal laws addressing antitrust, securities, RICO, patent, 
copyright, bankruptcy, discrimination, and ERISA.19 
Beginning in the 1980s, however, the Supreme Court shifted 
course and began to promote the use of arbitration by reading the FAA 
more expansively.  In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
                                                          
 15.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 16.  9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012). 
 17.  9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
 18.  346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
 19.  See WARE, supra note 14, at 72–73 nn.32734 (citing cases); see also Judith Res-
nik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and 
Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 115 (2011) (“Between 1953 and 1983, the Court 
heard fifteen cases in which arbitration was at issue, and in the four in which an individual 
(as contrasted with a corporation) objected, the Court declined to require arbitration.” (foot-
note omitted)). 
SovernFinalBookProof 10/4/2015  12:06 AM 
8 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:1 
Construction Corp.,20 the Court declared that Section 2 of the FAA “is 
a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or 
procedural policies to the contrary.”21  It relied on that policy rationale 
to then announce that “[t]he effect of the section is to create a body of 
federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration 
agreement within the coverage of the Act.”22 
The following year, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,23 the Court 
affirmed the preemptive effect of the FAA, holding that state laws 
prohibiting enforcement of arbitration agreements with respect to 
certain claims violate the Supremacy Clause.24  “In enacting § 2 of the 
[F]ederal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration 
and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the 
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by 
arbitration.”25  Then, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth,26 the Court opened the door to mandatory arbitration of 
statutory claims27 by enforcing an arbitration agreement in a dispute 
arising under U.S. antitrust law.28 
After Mitsubishi, the Court rapidly expanded the reach of the FAA 
and the availability of mandatory arbitration.  Two years later, in 
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,29 the Court enforced an 
arbitration clause in a case alleging garden-variety fraud claims against 
a securities broker under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
RICO.30  Two years after that, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
                                                          
 20.  460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 21.  Id. at 24. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 24.  Id. at 16.  The state law at issue was the California Franchise Investment Law, which 
had been held by the California Supreme Court to require judicial consideration of claims 
arising under it.  Id. at 10. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 27. The Supreme Court had permitted arbitration of a federal statutory claim in Scherk 
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519–20 (1974), a case seeking relief under Section 10 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  But the effect of that decision had been muted 
because, in the same year, the Court held that an employee could not be compelled to submit 
to binding arbitration of claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Al-
exander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974). 
 28.  Mitsbuishi, 473 U.S. at 624–25. 
 29.  482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
 30.  Id. at 238.  The aggrieved investors alleged “fraudulent, excessive trading on re-
spondents’ accounts and . . . making false statements and omitting material facts from the 
advice given to respondents.”  Id. at 223. 
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Shearson/American Express, Inc.,31 the Court overruled Wilko by 
holding claims under the Securities Act of 1933 arbitrable.32  And in 
1991, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,33 the Court enforced 
an arbitration clause in a dispute involving employment discrimination 
claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.34  
Since then, whenever the issue of arbitrability has been presented, the 
Court has found the claim subject to arbitration, regardless of its legal 
basis.35 
Businesses responded to the Supreme Court’s expansive 
arbitration jurisprudence by adding arbitration clauses to their contracts 
with consumers.  Many of the clauses included “class waivers”—
provisions in the arbitration agreement purporting to waive the right to 
seek collective or class relief.36  A lopsided split developed in the 
federal circuit courts, with the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, and Eleventh upholding arbitral class waivers and the First and 
Ninth refusing to enforce them, typically on grounds of state law 
unconscionability.37 
In 2011, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,38 the Supreme 
Court resolved the split in favor of allowing class waivers.39  The Court 
in Concepcion held that the FAA preempted a California rule nullifying 
class waivers in contracts of adhesion where consumers seek small 
amounts of individual damages and allege a scheme to defraud large 
numbers of consumers out of such small amounts.40  The Court 
concluded that Congress intended to promote arbitration in a form 
designed to achieve the traditional arbitral goals of efficiency, 
                                                          
 31. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 32.  Id. at 485. 
 33.  500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 34.  Id. at 26. 
 35. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 670 (2012) (holding that 
language in Credit Repair Organizations Act providing consumers with a “right” to bring an 
action in court and using terms “action,” “class action,” and “court” do not indicate congres-
sional intent to require judicial enforcement of claims arising under the Act). 
 36.  See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, 
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 6 (2000) (“Increasingly, poten-
tial defendants are drafting arbitration clauses that explicitly bar class actions, hoping that 
these will facilitate favorable court rulings.”). 
 37.  See Byron Rice, Enforceable or Not?: Class Action Waivers in Mandatory Arbitra-
tion Clauses and the Need for a Judicial Standard, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 215, 226 (2008). 
 38.  131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 39.  See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-
Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 
375–80 (2011) (analyzing Concepcion decision and its impact). 
 40.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747–48. 
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confidentiality, decisional expertise, and procedural flexibility.41  Class 
arbitration would frustrate these goals.42  Because the California rule 
effectively required either class arbitration or no arbitration at all, the 
California rule could not stand.43 
In sum, the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence establishes 
that any claim is potentially subject to arbitration absent an express 
congressional declaration that arbitration is prohibited.  A disparity in 
bargaining power—such as the one between consumers and 
businesses—does not change that result.  Arbitration agreements in 
contracts of adhesion are enforceable.  Further, an arbitration agreement 
in a contract of adhesion can require a waiver of the right to join with 
others in pursuing aggregate claims. 
Once in arbitration, parties are subject to the normal rules of 
arbitration, including rules of finality that allow for judicial review of 
arbitral awards only upon a narrow set of grounds tied to arbitrator 
misconduct.44  The Supreme Court has held that the statutory grounds 
for vacatur of arbitral awards in the FAA are exclusive, effectively 
precluding judicial attempts to intervene in the arbitration process to 
correct legally erroneous awards.45  Regardless of their relative 
positions, circumstances, and claims, parties who agree to arbitration 
forfeit the right to judicial process; if that agreement includes a class 
                                                          
 41.  Id. at 1750–51. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 1753. 
 44.  See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012).  The FAA permits a court to vacate an arbitral award only 
on the following grounds: 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where 
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) 
where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hear-
ing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of 
any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their pow-
ers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon 
the subject matter submitted was not made. 
Id. 
 45.  Hall St. Ass’n v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405 (2007).  The Court in Hall 
Street suggested in dicta that judge-made grounds for vacatur, most notably “manifest disre-
gard of the law,” were inconsistent with the FAA.  Id. at 1403–04; see Richard C. Reuben, 
Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 1140 (2009) 
(“By holding that the statutory grounds are ‘exclusive,’ the Supreme Court appears to have 
precluded the lower courts from considering arguments that an arbitral award may be vacated 
on non-statutory grounds.”); cf. Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The 
“Manifest Disregard of the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 180 (2011) (finding splits 
within the federal circuits and among the states on the issue of whether manifest disregard 
survives as an independent grounds of review after Hall Street). 
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waiver, they forfeit their right to join with others similarly situated and 
they have no recourse to a court if they are unhappy with the results. 
B.  The Prevalence of Business-Consumer Arbitration 
Agreements and Class Waivers 
The business community has responded to the Supreme Court’s 
expansive arbitration jurisprudence by adding arbitration clauses to 
many common consumer contracts.46  With prominent companies 
including AT&T Wireless, Verizon, Sprint, and PayPal all 
incorporating arbitration agreements into their standard contracts, 
American consumers routinely agree to arbitrate product-related 
disputes.  Often, when consumers agree to arbitrate with a company, 
they are also agreeing to forego the right to join in a class action with 
other consumers against that company.  These trends are especially 
pronounced in the financial services industry.  The following research 
provides empirical support for those propositions. 
1.  Prevalence of Arbitration Agreements in Consumer 
Contracts 
In a 2004 study, Linda Demaine and Deborah Hensler researched 
the arbitration policies of the major businesses in thirty-seven 
industries.47  They found that more than 35% of the 161 businesses they 
surveyed included arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts.48  
Unsurprisingly, the numbers were highest in industries, such as 
financial services, in which businesses and consumers interact in 
ongoing relationships governed by written contracts.49  Demaine and 
Hensler found that almost 70% of the businesses in the financial sector 
required consumers to arbitrate.50  In contrast, none of the businesses in 
                                                          
 46.  See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY PRELIMINARY 
RESULTS: SECTION 1028(A) STUDY RESULTS TO DATE 54 (2013) [hereinafter “CFPB 
PRELIMINARY STUDY”], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_arbitration-study-
preliminary-results.pdf (“Only limited data on changes in checking account contracts since 
Concepcion are available, but those data reveal a noticeable increase in the inclusion of ar-
bitration clauses among large banks since mid-2012.”); PEW CHARITABLE TRS, CHECKS 
AND BALANCES 33 (2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2014/04/09/Check-
sandBalancesReport2014.pdf (finding decline in number of banks eschewing mandatory ar-
bitration clauses from 2013 to 2014). 
 47.  Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through 
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 55, 58–59 (2004). 
 48.  Id. at 62. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
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the food and entertainment industry provided for arbitration with 
consumers.51 
A 2008 study by Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller and Emily 
Sherwin confirmed the prevalence of arbitration in industries where 
written contracts with large numbers of consumers are the norm.52  
Eisenberg and his colleagues analyzed twenty-six consumer contracts 
drafted by twenty-one major companies in the telecommunications and 
finance industries.53  They found that over 75% of those contracts 
included an arbitration clause.54  Amy Schmitz reached similar results 
in her analysis of credit card and mobile phone contracts, finding that 
ten of thirteen credit card contracts and all nine mobile phone contracts 
she analyzed included arbitration clauses.55 
In a more comprehensive study of the extent of arbitration in the 
credit card industry, Peter Rutledge and Chris Drahozal found that, by 
2009, over 95% of outstanding credit card loans were covered by an 
arbitration agreement.56  In 2009, however, two events caused a 
dramatic reduction in the use of arbitration agreements in credit card 
contracts.  First, the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”), which at the 
time was the largest provider of consumer credit arbitrations 
nationwide, ceased administering new consumer credit arbitrations as 
part of its settlement of a consumer fraud lawsuit filed by the Minnesota 
Attorney General.57  Second, four of the largest issuers of credit cards 
agreed to remove the arbitration provisions from their credit card 
agreements for three and a half years as part of the settlement of an 
antitrust lawsuit alleging that the banks conspired to force consumers 
                                                          
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer 
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Con-
tracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 882–83 (2008). 
 53.  Id. at 881. 
 54.  Id. at 882–83.  In contrast to the high prevalence of arbitration in their consumer 
contracts, less than 10% of those companies non-consumer negotiated contracts contained 
an arbitration clause.  Id. 
 55.  Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting 
Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 145–47 (2010). 
 56.  Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2013). 
 57.  Id. at 18–19.  The lawsuit alleged that the NAF, a for-profit entity with financial 
ties to attorneys who represented banks in the arbitrations NAF conducted, had systemati-
cally rubber-stamped the demands of banks in debt collection arbitrations; see also Ameet 
Sachdev, Consumer Arbitration Firm No Longer to Settle Disputes, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (July 
21, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-07-21/news/0907200461_1_national-ar-
bitration-forum-arbitration-clauses-consumer-arbitration. 
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to accept arbitration agreements containing class waivers.58  As a 
consequence, by the end of 2010, the percentage of outstanding credit 
card loans subject to an arbitration agreement had dropped to 48%.59 
That figure had increased only slightly as of 2012, when the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the agency created 
by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
to oversee the financial services industry,60 undertook a large-scale 
study of arbitration agreements in credit card contracts, checking 
account contracts, and general purpose reloadable (“GPR”) prepaid 
cards.61  The CFPB found that just over half of outstanding credit card 
loans were covered by an arbitration agreement, while just under half 
of insured deposits at banks were similarly covered.62  In contrast, more 
than 68% of the dollar amount loaded on prepaid cards was covered by 
an arbitration agreement.63  The wide disparity between credit cards and 
prepaid cards seems to be explained by the antitrust settlement.  The 
four issuers that agreed to remove their arbitration clauses account for 
almost 87% of the outstanding credit card debt not covered by an 
arbitration clause.64  The CFPB estimates that if those issuers had not 
removed their arbitration clauses, more than 94% of outstanding credit 
card debt would be covered by an arbitration agreement.65 
2.  The Incorporation of Class Waivers in Arbitration 
Agreements 
Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin found that three quarters of the 
consumer contracts they studied included an arbitration agreement, and 
that every one of the consumer contracts mandating arbitration included 
                                                          
 58. See Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 56, at 19.  The settling banks were Bank of 
America, Chase, Capital One, and HSBC.  Id.; see also Ross v. Bank of Am., 524 F.3d 217, 
219 (2d Cir. 2008); Erin Holmes, Recent Developments: Ross v. Bank of America, 24 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 387, 389 n.19 (2009).  For an example of one of the consent decrees, 
see Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement with JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Chase Bank 
USA, N.A., Ross v. Bank of Am., No. 05-cv-7116 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2010), https://www.ar-
bitration.ccfsettlement.com/documents/files/2010-02-23-stip-and-agreement-with-
chase.pdf. 
 59.  See Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 56, at 18. 
 60. See Lydia DePillis, A Watchdog Grows Up: The Inside Story of the Consumer Fi-
nancial Products Bureau, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Jan. 11, 2014), http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/01/11/a-watchdog-grows-up-the-inside-story-of-
the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/. 
 61.  CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 9–10. 
 62.  Id. at 19. 
 63.  Id. at 27. 
 64.  Id. at 23. 
 65.  Id. 
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a class waiver.66  Drahozal and Rutledge found that 99.9% of credit card 
loans subject to an arbitration agreement were also covered by a class 
waiver.67  The CFPB, looking only at consumer contracts, identified 
class waivers in 99.9% of the arbitration agreements covering 
outstanding credit card loans, 97.1% of the agreements covering 
insured deposits, and 100% of the agreements covering dollar amounts 
loaded on prepaid cards.68 
Businesses that offer similar products to large numbers of 
consumers have powerful incentives to limit their exposure to aggregate 
claims.69  Especially now that the Supreme Court has validated the 
inclusion of class waivers in arbitration agreements, arbitration 
provides a mechanism to do that.  As prime targets for class litigation, 
credit card issuers are among the businesses most likely to favor arbitral 
class waivers.  Indeed, but for the 2009 antitrust settlement, all but a 
small percentage of outstanding credit card debt would be covered by 
an arbitration agreement containing a class waiver.  Absent legislation, 
regulation, or further litigation, class arbitration waivers will likely 
return to their former ubiquity in credit card agreements as the effects 
of the settlement wear off.70 
III.  REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
Some research has been conducted into consumers’ understanding 
of contract terms generally; more limited research has studied 
consumers’ understanding of arbitration agreements.  In this Section, 
we survey the existing literature on these subjects. 
                                                          
 66.  Eisenberg et al., supra note 52, at 876 (comparing the contracts businesses impose 
on consumers with the same businesses’ negotiated, non-consumer, non-employee con-
tracts).  Less than 10% of the other contracts provided for arbitration of disputes.  Id. 
 67.  Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 56, at 25. 
 68.  CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 37. 
 69.  See Eisenberg et al., supra note 52, at 891–92 (suggesting that variations in the use 
of arbitration can be explained by industrial concentration and corresponding exposure to 
high volume, low value claims). 
 70.  See Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly” 
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 
853 (2012).  Professor Gilles examined thirty-seven arbitration clauses from major compa-
nies in a range of industries, including telecommunications, consumer banking and credit 
cards, e-commerce, and entertainment, and found that each one included a class waiver.  Id. 
at 850–53. 
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A.  Research into Consumer Understanding of Contract Terms 
Generally 
Consumers may not understand the terms they accept for two 
reasons.  First, consumers may not read contracts at all.  Second, even 
when they read contracts, consumers may not understand the terms 
contained in those contracts.  Here we take up each of those issues in 
turn. 
1. The Likelihood That Consumers Read Contracts 
Several studies have found that most consumers do not read or 
barely read contracts.  For example, a study of 45,091 households 
visiting the websites of sixty-six online software companies found that 
“only one or two out of every 1,000 retail software shoppers access the 
license agreement and that most of those who do access read no more 
than a small portion” of the license text.71  The authors also reported 
that “shoppers are more likely to access [End User License 
Agreements] of smaller companies or companies that offer potentially 
suspicious products, such as freeware.”72  Because arbitration clauses 
appear in the contracts of many large well-known companies, such as 
Citibank and Verizon Wireless, it may be that consumers are less likely 
to read and notice such arbitration clauses.  Of particular relevance to 
                                                          
 71.  Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read 
the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 
(2014) (“All sides in this debate realize that, in many circumstances, a majority of buyers do 
not read the fine print.  For many buyers, too much time is required to read and give mean-
ingful assent, and fine print can be too difficult to understand or may seem unimportant.”); 
id. at 32 (“[W]e estimate that the fraction of retail software shoppers who access [End User 
License Agreements (“EULAs”)] is between .05 percent and .22 percent, and most of the 
few shoppers who do access EULAs do not spend enough time doing so to have digested 
more than a fraction of their content. . . .  Even under generous assumptions, it is difficult to 
envision the probability that EULAs are read (and understood) growing even to 1 percent.”); 
see also Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter? 4 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 10-54, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=1713860 (finding that less than .5% of consumers read EULAs for at least one 
second); 7,500 Online Shoppers Unknowingly Sold Their Souls, FOX NEWS (Apr. 15, 
2010), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/04/15/online-shoppers-unknowingly-sold-
souls/ (reporting that consumers who agreed to a computer game company’s EULA prom-
ised to surrender their “immortal soul” upon demand; as many as 88% of consumers shown 
the contract agreed to it even though they were offered the option of clicking on a box which 
would have enabled them to retain their souls, as well as receive a voucher for five British 
pounds); Victoria C. Plaut & Robert P. Bartlett III, Blind Consent? A Social Psychological 
Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-Through Agreements, LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 15 
(2011) (finding that 80% of consumers surveyed said they either did not read click-through 
contracts at all or did not really read anything; 16.5% said they skimmed such agreements; 
89.4% described themselves as non-readers of such agreements). 
 72.  Bakos et al., supra note 71, at 4. 
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this Article is that a survey of ninety-two law students produced fifty-
four respondents, or 59%, who reported that under some circumstances 
they might read an e-purchase contract beyond the price and description 
of the goods.73  Of these, sixteen said that the nature of a term might 
prompt them to read the contract, and of these sixteen, only one said 
that an arbitration or choice of law clause would cause them to read the 
contract.74 
Consumer financial contracts fare little better.  A study 
commissioned by the Federal Reserve reported that “When shown a 
sample cardholder agreement, few of the [focus group] participants said 
they would read the entire document if they received it. . . . In each 
group about half of participants said that they would not look at the 
cardholder agreement at all.”75  The study also noted that “[p]articipants 
                                                          
 73.  Robert A. Hillman, On-Line Consumer Standard-Form Contracting Practices: A 
Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications 1, 8 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper, 
Working Paper No. 05-012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=686817.  Hillman’s survey of ninety-
two law students found: 
[only 4%] read their e-standard forms beyond price and description of the goods 
or services “as a general matter.”  Further, beyond price and description, a large 
minority of respondents do not read their forms at all.  However, more than a third 
of the respondents read their forms when the value of the contract is high and more 
than a third read when the vendor is unknown.  Further, a small cadre of respond-
ents read particular terms beyond price and description, primarily warranties and 
product information warnings. 
Id. at 2, 7 (footnotes omitted). 
 74.  Id. at 11–12.  Of course, law students should be expected to pay more attention to 
contracts than others, something the author of the study pointed out, but the survey results 
did not support this assumption.  Id. at 5. 
 75.  MACRO INT’L INC., DESIGN AND TESTING OF EFFECTIVE TRUTH IN LENDING 
DISCLOSURES 6, 11 (2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/dcca/regulationz/20070523/ex-
ecsummary.pdf (report submitted to Federal Reserve Board) (“Participants paid very little 
attention to the cardholder agreement; only a few participants looked at it at all, and these 
only skimmed it briefly.  When asked, a vast majority of participants indicated that they 
generally do not look at their cardholder agreements.”); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Pizza-Box 
Contracts: True Tales of Consumer Contracting Culture, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 863, 
886–87 (2010) (“[O]nly 90 of the 264 survey respondents who recalled signing up for a 
credit card indicated that they read credit card terms and found them important. . . .  [T]hese 
responses should be viewed in light of individuals’ propensity to overstate their competence 
or socially desirable behavior. . . .  [T]he percentages of those who truly read their contracts 
is likely lower than the results indicated.”); Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A 
License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Reali-
ties, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617, 694–700 (2009) (reporting that more than a fifth of consum-
ers in survey acknowledged not reading a contract to purchase a home; 71% stated they did 
not read all the terms in car rental contracts; 95% reported not reading all the terms when 
downloading software; 43% acknowledged not reading all the terms in an apartment rental 
agreement; 6% said they did not read any of the terms in their mortgage loan documents 
while 77% stated that they had not read all the terms); Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-
Aviram, The Law of Standard Form Contracts: Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for 
Reconstruction 12 (Aug. 4 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with DePaul Business & 
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indicated that they would be unlikely to read a change-in-terms insert 
that was included with their periodic statement, and would probably 
throw it away . . . .”76  A survey of mortgage brokers found that about 
half stated that less than 10% of consumers receiving the final Truth in 
Lending Act (“TILA”) mortgage disclosures—which are the only TILA 
forms required to disclose the actual loan terms—devoted more than a 
minute to the disclosures; more than two-thirds of the brokers reported 
that less than 30% of the borrowers spent more than a minute on the 
disclosures.77 
Some consumers seem unwilling to read standard forms even after 
being given a lesson in the dangers of not reading them.  In one 
experiment, test subjects were given a dummy consent form that 
counseled against signing the form as against the subjects’ best 
interests; the forms obliged subjects to administer electric shocks to 
people, among other discomforting tasks.78  Over 95% of the subjects 
agreed to the dummy consent, after which they were told about the 
deception.79  Upon being asked to sign a genuine consent, the average 
subject then spent only sixteen seconds reading it; only a fifth read the 
form through; and more than a third did not bother to read any of it.80 
                                                          
Commercial Law Journal), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443908 (finding that many consumers 
report not reading standard form contracts for car rentals, laundry services, or bank accounts, 
but more stated they would read a nursery school placement contract; many consumers said 
they would skim the contracts before signing them). 
 76.  MACRO INT’L INC., supra note 75, at 6. 
 77.  Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection 
Law or How the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 
783–84 (2010); see also Thomas A. Durkin & Gregory Elliehausen, Disclosure as a Con-
sumer Protection, in THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT 109, 129 
(Thomas A. Durkin & Michael E. Staten eds., 2002) (reporting on surveys of consumers over 
different years finding that 33% to 38% of respondents somewhat disagree with the statement 
“Most People Read Their Truth-in-Lending Statements Carefully,” and 27% to 34% of re-
spondents disagree strongly with it). 
 78.  Stark & Choplin, supra note 75, at 679. 
 79.  Id. at 681. 
 80.  Id. at 680–82.  Some people evidently believe that they would be more likely to 
read contract terms printed in bold or highlighted in other ways.  See Hillman, supra note 
73, at 13 (finding that in a survey of ninety-two law students “more respondents thought that 
they would read bold or otherwise highlighted text (42% or 39/92) than either when the terms 
appear in a pop-up window (24% or 22/92) or when the terms appear on the screen as a series 
of individual windows that must be clicked (23% or 21/92)”).  Still others were influenced 
by being given certain statements before being shown a click-through agreement.  Plaut & 
Bartlett, supra note 71, at 28.  In one study, consumers spent an average of fourteen seconds 
more reading such contracts after being told that the contract was relevant to them; sixty-two 
seconds more when told that the contract had different terms from other such contracts; and 
twenty-four seconds more when told that they could modify the contact.  Id. at 28.  In con-
trast, telling consumers that most people read the agreement or that the agreement was of-
fered by a reputable vendor did not produce a difference in reading time that was statistically 
SovernFinalBookProof 10/4/2015  12:06 AM 
18 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:1 
Many disclosure critics argue that it is rational for consumers not 
to read disclosures.81  The quantity of fine print alone is a barrier.82  For 
example, the iTunes contract is reportedly thirty-two feet long, even 
when printed in 8 font type.83  And that is only one contract.  Consumers 
                                                          
significant.  Id. at 28–29.  Giving consumers a version of the click-through contract with the 
suggestion that it was short and skimmable also increased the time they spent reading.  Id. at 
33. 
 81.  See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED 
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 10 (2014) (“[E]xperience teaches peo-
ple how little they may gain from studying disclosures and how little they may lose by ig-
noring them.  In short, people often calculate that a well-informed decision’s benefits poorly 
justify its costs.”).  Ben-Shahar and Schneider add: 
In [the disclosurite] world, people (1) recognize that unfamiliar and complex de-
cisions matter and depend on their own interests and circumstances and (2) learn 
enough to make informed and considered decisions that promote their interests 
and preferences.  In the real world, however, people in surprising numbers and 
circumstances (1) resist making even significant decisions and (2) make them with 
incomplete information and inconsiderable effort.  People are, loosely and 
broadly, decision averse.  They are therefore unlikely to seek out or study disclo-
sures. 
Id.  at 61; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 305 (1986) (“[C]on-
sumers who are faced with . . . form contracts . . . refus[e] to read, and . . . it is reasonable 
for them to do so.”); Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of 
Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 717 (1992) 
(“[P]urchasers would be acting irrationally if they incurred the costs required to fully com-
prehend all contract terms.”); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: 
Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 600 (1990) (“It is, therefore, 
rational for even a conscientious consumer to pay little, if any, attention to subordinate con-
tract terms.”). 
 82.  See Hillman, supra note 73, at 2 (“[I]mpatience accounts most often for the failure 
of respondents to read their forms.”); Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 75, at 12 (noting 
that a majority of study participants would either not read or merely skim standard form 
contracts). 
 83.  BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 81, at 24.  Ben-Shahar and Schneider com-
piled a list of reasons why consumers ignore disclosures, including: (1) “[T]hey think they 
know what they say.”  Id. at 75.  (2)  “[T]hey look irrelevant.”  Id.  (3) “[T]hey think that 
what they get and how they are treated depend more on the person or place they’re dealing 
with than any disclosure.”  Id.  (4) “[T]hey think transactions are safe.”  Id.  (5) They’ve “got 
to have this no matter what the disclosure says.”  Id. at 76.  (6) “[C]ompanies use fine print 
to protect themselves.”  Id.  (7) “Disclosees soon learn (to paraphrase Thurber) that disclo-
sure[s] tell them more about penguins than they want to know, but incomprehensibly.”  Id.  
(8) “Disclosees do not always recognize that they are being given information they are sup-
posed to study and use.”  Id. at 77.  (9) “Boring!”  Id. See also Plaut & Bartlett, supra note 
71, at 35 (finding that consumers report they do not read standard form contracts because 
they all say the same thing and offer no choice); Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and 
Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 69 MICH. L. REV. 247, 256–57 (1970) (“When questioned 
about the reasons for not reading leases, thirty-three per cent of those tenants who did not 
read leases particularly carefully before signing them pointed to the lease being a ‘take it or 
leave it’ proposition . . . ; twenty-six per cent admitted finding the very length of the lease 
contract form to be discouraging and confusing; twenty per cent said they thought they would 
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choosing among credit cards by examining the associated contracts may 
need to read dozens of pages of fine print.  Even then, the task is not 
finished because, scholars argue, contract terms frequently change and 
so must be periodically re-read.84 
One reason contracts are so long is that they include terms 
addressing improbable contingencies, such as provisions for resolution 
of disputes.  Consumers who read contracts may find provisions dealing 
with unlikely events particularly valueless and therefore skip over 
them.85 
In addition to their sheer length, consumer contracts are typically 
drafted in dense language, discouraging all but the most intrepid from 
reading the fine print.  In Tess Wilkinson-Ryan’s words, “[n]ot only are 
form contracts unread, they are functionally unreadable (or at least 
indigestible) for consumers with bounded cognitive capacity—i.e., 
everyone.”86  Anecdotal reports suggest that even the brightest legal 
minds do not read boilerplate.  Both Chief Justice John Roberts and 
Judge Posner have acknowledged signing contracts without perusing 
the fine print.87 
                                                          
be unable to understand all the ‘legal language’; and only three per cent said they could not 
be bothered to take the time and trouble . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 84.  See, e.g., BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 81, at 73 (noting that “disclosures 
can change rapidly”).  For example, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau reported that 
some credit card issuers filed new contracts every quarter, implying frequent alterations in 
contract terms.  See CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 132. 
 85. See Goldman, supra note 81, at 717 (“The costs of obtaining and understanding 
information about contract terms are especially daunting when the form terms involve risks 
that are unlikely to occur.”); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Recon-
struction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1226 (1983) (“[M]any of the terms [in standard form 
contracts] concern risks that in any individual transaction are unlikely to eventuate.  It is 
notoriously difficult for most people, who lack legal advice and broad experience concerning 
the particular transaction type, to appraise these sorts of contingencies.”). 
 86.  See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1749 (2014); see also Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 309 (“The average 
consumer knows that he probably will be unable to fully understand the dense text of a form 
contract . . . .”); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in 
the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 436 (2002) (“[T]he consumer would not under-
stand much of the language of the boilerplate even if she took the time to read it.”). 
 87.  See Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts Admits He Doesn’t Read the Com-
puter Fine Print, ABAJ (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_jus-
tice_roberts_admits_he_doesnt_read_the_computer_fine_print/; Debra Cassens Weiss, 
Judge Posner Admits He Didn’t Read Boilerplate for Home Equity Loan, ABAJ (June 23, 
2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_posner_admits_he_didnt_read_boil-
erplate_for_home_equity_loan/. 
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2.  Consumers’ Comprehension of Contract Terms 
Many contract terms are subject to disclosure laws mandating that 
some terms be disclosed clearly and conspicuously in specified 
formats.88  Businesses also frequently wish to include in their contracts 
additional terms not subject to these disclosure mandates.  Depending 
on the particular contract, these documents—disclosures and other 
terms—may be provided separately or combined into a single contract.  
The credit card contract we provided to consumers was an example of 
the latter: it opened with the so-called Schumer Box—that is, a set of 
credit card disclosures mandated by the Federal Truth in Lending Act 
and its implementing regulations89—followed by other contract terms. 
Strictly speaking, arbitration clauses fit into the “other terms” 
category, because the United States Supreme Court has turned back 
state attempts to mandate conspicuous disclosure of arbitration clauses 
and the FAA does not mandate disclosure requirements for arbitration 
clauses.90  Nevertheless, in many consumer contracts, arbitration 
clauses are more conspicuous than other contract terms.  Thus, the 
arbitration clause in the contract we used was printed in bold type and 
portions appeared in italics and ALLCAPS.  In addition, at the 
beginning of the textual portion appearing on page two (the first page 
was devoted entirely to the Schumer Box disclosures), the contract 
included a boldface reference to the arbitration clause.91  Accordingly, 
the arbitration clause in our contract, as is true of many such clauses, is 
a hybrid, more conspicuous than conventional terms, but perhaps less 
so than required disclosures.  As a result, our review of the literature 
includes studies of both mandated disclosures and other terms. 
Numerous commentators have noted the linguistic and legal 
complexity of typical consumer contracts.  Alan M. White and Cathy 
                                                          
 88. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (2012) (rules governing contents of warranties); 12 
C.F.R. § 1026.18 (2014) (closed-end credit: content of disclosures).  Some laws use other 
language to increase the likelihood that consumers notice mandated disclosures.  See, e.g., 
15 U.S.C. § 1692g (2012) (communications may not “overshadow” debt collection disclo-
sure); 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (2012) (limitation on duration of implied warranties to be “prom-
inently displayed”). 
 89. See 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.6(b) (2013).  The Schumer Box is 
named after then-representative Charles Schumer.  As can be seen from the sample contract 
appended to this Article, it includes a variety of disclosures lawmakers thought would be of 
the greatest concern to the typical consumer shopping for a credit card, such as the APR, 
annual fee, penalty fees, and the like. 
 90.  Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (holding that state 
law requiring arbitration terms to be conspicuous was preempted by FAA). 
 91.  The reference read, in bold type: “This Agreement contains an arbitration provision 
(including a class action arbitration waiver).  It is important that you read the entire Arbitra-
tion Provision section carefully.” 
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Lesser Mansfield have written that “[t]he degree of literacy required to 
comprehend the average disclosure form and key contract terms simply 
is not within reach of the majority of American adults.”92  Judge Posner 
has explained “not all persons are capable of being careful readers.”93  
Former Federal Reserve Chair Ben S. Bernanke, whose agency was 
responsible for administering the Truth in Lending disclosures, among 
others, has said that “not even the best disclosures are always 
adequate. . . .  [S]ome aspects of increasingly complex products simply 
cannot be adequately understood or evaluated by most consumers, no 
matter how clear the disclosure.”94  And noted scholar and now-Senator 
Elizabeth Warren, who conceived the idea of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, has been quoted as saying about a credit card 
contract: “I teach contract law at Harvard, and I can’t understand half 
of what it says.”95 
Those observations have been confirmed by empirical research. 
Debra Pogrund Stark and Jessica M. Choplin have identified fourteen 
“cognitive and social psychological factors that cause disclosure forms 
to be ineffective.”96  In a landmark 2007 study of Truth in Lending 
mortgage disclosures, the Federal Trade Commission found that many 
consumers could not understand key loan terms even while reading the 
forms.97  Mortgage borrowers have a significant incentive to master 
                                                          
 92.  Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 233, 237–39 (2002) (“[L]arge numbers of adults have limited quantitative liter-
acy skills. . . .  [Ninety-six percent] of American adults cannot extract and compute credit 
cost information from contract and disclosure documents.”); see also BEN-SHAHAR & 
SCHNEIDER, supra note 81, at 79 (“Many people cannot read many disclosures because they 
are not literate or numerate enough to decipher them with reasonable effort.”). 
 93.  Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., 71 F.3d 1343, 1347 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 94.  Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Reserve System’s 
Biennial Community Affairs Research Conference: Financial Innovation and Consumer Pro-
tection (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.federalre-
serve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090417a.htm. 
 95.  BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 81, at 8; see Durkin & Elliehausen, supra 
note 77, at 14546 (discussant Joan Warrington, an attorney for Citigroup stating, “[e]ven 
with a law degree and a career in consumer credit, I still have problems understanding many 
of the disclosures that I see.”). 
 96.  Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological 
Analysis of Disclosure Laws and Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lend-
ing, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 85, 97 (2010). 
 97.  See JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FED. TRADE COMM’N BUREAU OF 
ECONOMICS, IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL 
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE FORMS 122 (2007), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/P025505MortgageDisclosurereport.pdf.  The report noted: 
About a fifth of the respondents viewing the current disclosure forms could not 
correctly identify the APR of the loan, the amount of the case due at closing, or 
the monthly payment . . . .  About a third could not identify the interest rate or 
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their loan terms because for most a mortgage is the largest financial 
obligation they will ever assume.  Yet other reports confirm that many 
consumers did not understand their mortgage terms—presumably 
disclosed via the TILA forms.98 
A 1977 study sheds some light on consumer awareness of 
arbitration clauses in particular, albeit clauses that, unlike the 
arbitration clauses frequently in use today and employed in our study, 
were not binding.99  The researcher showed consumers two versions of 
a consumer-credit contract for the purchase of a refrigerator, one 
simpler than the other, and then a warranty on the sale of the refrigerator 
that included an arbitration clause.100  The “long” credit contract was 
about four pages in length while the short version was less than two; the 
warranty spanned a page, meaning that consumers in the long contract 
condition read approximately five pages and those in the short contract 
                                                          
which of two loans was less expensive, and a third did not recognize that the loan 
included a large balloon payment . . . .  Half could not correctly identify the loan 
amount.  Two-thirds did not recognize that they would be charged a prepayment 
penalty if in two years they refinanced with another lender . . . .  Three-quarters 
did not recognize that substantial charges for optional credit insurance were in-
cluded in the loan. . . .  [N]early nine-tenths could not identify the total amount of 
up-front charges in the loan. 
Id.  The disclosures have since been revised.  See Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under 
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) and the Truth In Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 79,730 (Dec. 31, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1024, 
1026). 
 98. See, e.g., IRA J. GOLDSTEIN, THE REINVESTMENT FUND, LOST VALUES: A STUDY 
OF PREDATORY LENDING IN PHILADELPHIA 17 (2007), http://www.trfund.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2013/06/Lost_Values.pdf (“Several borrowers interviewed . . . reported think-
ing that they have one loan when they have two.”); Brian Bucks & Karen Pence, Do Home-
owners Know Their House Values and Mortgage Terms 2 (FEDS, Working Paper No. 2006-
03, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=899152 (“[A] sizable number 
of adjustable-rate borrowers report that they do not know the terms of their contracts.”); see 
also Plaut & Bartlett, supra note 71, at 19 (finding that surveyed consumers “have little com-
prehension of the terms to which they have agreed”). 
 99.  See Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: 
An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV. 841 
(1977). 
 100.  Id. at 856, 867 n.87.  Professor Davis reported that he did not try to secure a sample 
that represented the nation’s demographics but simply visited a suburban grocery store and 
an urban one.  Id. at 868.  The arbitration clause said: 
In the Event of a Dispute—XYZ is a subscriber to an arbitration agreement which 
is made available for all consumers who are unable to have their warranty claims 
satisfactorily settled through us.  You are obligated to submit to this arbitration 
procedure after unsuccessful attempts to settle any warranty claim before attempt-
ing to satisfy your claim through litigation. 
Id. at 914 app. C. 
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condition read less than three.101  The survey then asked a series of 
questions about the documents, including one which tested awareness 
and understanding of the arbitration clause.102  More than 60% of the 
consumers who had seen the simplified credit card contract answered 
the arbitration question correctly, while nearly half of those who had 
seen the more complex credit card contract were able to choose the 
correct response.103 
A more recent study surveyed thirty-seven employees of a 
company that required the employees to sign a mandatory arbitration 
agreement.104  While 67% of the employees recalled signing the 
agreement,105 only three of the employees remembered that the 
agreement required arbitration.106  Nearly a third believed that the 
provision blocking them from suing in court would not be enforced by 
a court.107  When the same researcher surveyed 115 MBA students at a 
prestigious East Coast business school,108 more than half believed that 
an arbitration clause barring them from suing in court would not be 
enforceable.109 
                                                          
 101.  Id. at 908–14.  Today’s credit card contracts that include arbitration clauses are 
usually longer, see supra notes 8283 and accompanying text. 
 102.  The question read: 
If the refrigerator fails during the warranty period, and XYZ refuses to fix it, 
claiming that the damage was your fault: 
(a) There is nothing you can do to force XYZ to honor its warranty. 
(b) Your only hope is to try to force XYZ to honor its warranty by such action as 
calling the Better Business Bureau, complaining to local officials, writing to 
newspapers, picketing, etc. 
(c) You can bring suit immediately to force XYZ to honor its warranty. 
(d) You may bring suit, but only after you have first submitted to an arbitration 
procedure. 
(e) Don’t know/unsure. 
Id. at 916–17 app. D. 
 103.  Id. at 876 tbl. IV.  Professor Davis observed that lower-income shoppers showed a 
more dramatic improvement from the long contract to the short contract, with a 17% increase 
in correct responses to the arbitration question while high-income shoppers improved only 
about 8% from the complex contract to the simple.  Id. at 877.  On all questions, consumers 
seeing the shorter contract answered an average of 56% of the questions correctly, while 
those who were shown the longer version scored 45% on average, a difference of 11%.  Id. 
at 876.  Again, the improvement from the complex contract to the simple was more pro-
nounced among low-income shoppers (18.5% improvement) versus high-income shoppers 
(6.5%).  Id. at 877. 
 104.  See Zev J. Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship Among Citizen-
ship, Rule of Law and Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV. 383, 409 (2008). 
 105.  Id. at 418. 
 106.  Id. at 401. 
 107.  Id. at 418. 
 108.  Id. at 419. 
 109.  Id. at 421. 
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Nor are consumers necessarily aware of their confusion.  One 
survey found that the median consumer who acknowledged not having 
read click-through agreements nevertheless rated his or her 
understanding of those contracts as a three on a six point scale.110  In 
fact, those who claimed to read such contracts fared no better in 
answering questions about the contract than those who confessed that 
they did not read the contracts.111 
In sum, existing research seems to confirm what the anecdotal 
evidence suggests: consumers struggle to read and understand 
consumer contracts.  Length and density deter consumers from 
attempting to read contract terms at all, and the terms are unintelligible 
for most people who attempt to read them. 
B.  Research into Consumer Understanding of Arbitration 
Agreements 
While substantial empirical research has been conducted into both 
the prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and 
consumer understanding of contract terms generally,112 less is known 
about consumers’ understanding of and attitudes toward either 
arbitration as a process or arbitration agreements in consumer 
contracts.113 
In 2012, the Pew Charitable Trusts commissioned a national 
survey of checking account holders to determine their attitudes about 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements.114  The survey found 
                                                          
 110.  Plaut & Bartlett, supra note 71, at 16.  In fact, the study found that consumers had 
“little comprehension of the terms . . . .”  Id. at 19.  The study also found that respondents 
did better on a quiz when given a shorter form of the contract than a longer form.  Id. at 31. 
 111.  Id. at 16. 
 112.  See infra Part III.A. 
 113.  Several industry-funded studies have surveyed individuals who had participated in 
arbitration to assess their perceptions of the process.  See Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbi-
tration?, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 560–61 (2008) (citing and describing studies).  The 
surveys found that solid majorities were satisfied with the arbitration process.  Id.  Most of 
the individuals surveyed, however, had voluntarily entered into arbitration.  TAYLOR 
LINCOLN & DAVID ARKUSH, PUB. CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP: HOW 
OPPONENTS OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY DISTORT THE DEBATE ON ARBITRATION 
19–22 (2008),  http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationDebateTrap(Final).pdf .  None 
of the studies addressed consumer understanding of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agree-
ments or their effects.  Id. 
 114.  PEW CHARITABLE TRS, BANKING ON ARBITRATION: BIG BANKS, CONSUMERS, 
AND CHECKING ACCOUNT DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1 (2012),  
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2012/11/27/Pew_arbitration_report.pdf.  The 
Pew study also examined account agreements for ninety-two of the 100 largest financial 
institutions in the United States and found that 43% included arbitration agreements in the 
contracts with consumers, with 75% of those barring class claims.  Id. at 3–4. 
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that, of 603 consumers surveyed, 68% believed they should have a 
choice between arbitrating and taking a dispute to court.115  Further, 
88% of the respondents reported dissatisfaction with the lack of judicial 
review of arbitral awards.116 
In 2010, the consumer advocacy group Public Citizen and the 
Employee Rights Advocacy Institute for Law and Policy commissioned 
a national phone survey of 800 likely voters to assess attitudes toward 
mandatory arbitration.117  Fifty-nine percent of survey respondents, 
when given a description of mandatory binding arbitration, responded 
that they opposed it.118  Without giving respondents an agreement to 
read, the survey also asked respondents whether they remembered 
seeing an arbitration agreement in an employment or consumer 
contract.  Approximately two-thirds of the respondents replied that they 
had not.119 
The CFPB recently conducted a national phone survey of 1007 
credit card consumers to explore their awareness of and assumptions 
about the dispute resolution options in those agreements.120  The 
respondents were asked about the terms in the contracts covering their 
most recently obtained credit cards.  A majority of respondents to the 
CFPB survey whose credit cards included arbitration clauses stated that 
they did not know if they could sue the credit card issuers in court, while 
more than a third thought they could sue in court.121 
                                                          
 115.  Id. at 7. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS, NATIONAL STUDY OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON 
FORCED ARBITRATION 2 (2009), http://www.citizen.org/documents/lake-research-national-
study-of-public-attitudes-forced-arbitration.pdf. 
 118  Id. at 4.  The respondents were asked the following question: 
Next I’m going to read you a short description of binding mandatory arbitration. 
Binding mandatory arbitration requires both sides to submit any future disputes to 
binding arbitration as a condition of having a job or buying a product or service.  
Binding mandatory arbitration is written into many Terms of Employment and 
Terms of Agreement for goods and services that you buy, including for insurance, 
home-building, car loans and leases, credit cards, retirement accounts, investment 
accounts, and nursing facilities, to name a few.  Binding mandatory arbitration 
means that employees and consumers waive their rights to sue, to participate in 
class-action lawsuits, or to appeal.  Having heard that, do you favor or oppose 
binding mandatory arbitration, or are you unsure? 
Id. 
 119.  Id. at 15.  The survey did not attempt to determine whether the respondents had in 
fact entered into any specific agreements containing arbitration clauses. 
 120.  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
PURSUANT TO DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
§ 1028(a), at 7 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-re-
port-to-congress-2015.pdf. 
 121.  Id. at § 3 at 3. 
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IV.  METHODOLOGY 
Our goal in this study was to assess the extent to which consumers 
both read and understand arbitration agreements in credit card 
contracts.  We hoped to recreate a typical business-consumer exchange, 
both in terms of the type of agreement respondents were given and the 
circumstances in which they received the contract.  In addition, we 
sought to assess consumers’ understanding of arbitration agreements 
generally and their awareness of arbitration agreements in their existing 
business-consumer relationships.  Here we describe the methodology 
we used to achieve those goals. 
A.  Survey Design and Structure 
We concluded that attempting to survey consumers in person 
would be impracticable.  Among other things, it would have been 
prohibitively expensive to get a sufficiently large and representative 
sample either by going door-to-door or surveying people in public.  
Because we wanted respondents to see and answer questions about a 
written contract, a phone survey would also have been impracticable.  
An online survey would complement the CFPB’s telephone survey.122  
Consequently, we chose to conduct a web-based survey using the 
Qualtrics platform.123 
After survey respondents completed the required consent form to 
participate, they were shown a representative sample consumer contract 
and then asked a series of questions about the contract and about 
arbitration more generally.124  The survey questions fell into four types: 
questions about awareness and understanding of the arbitration clause 
in the sample consumer contract participants were shown; questions 
about respondents’ awareness and understanding of arbitration clauses 
in consumer contracts generally; questions about respondents’ 
experiences with contracts; and questions about participants’ 
demographics. 
While many consumer contracts include an arbitration clause, we 
chose a credit card contract for our sample contract for two reasons.125  
First, the survey results have more value if based on a contract that is a 
                                                          
 122.  See CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46. 
 123.  Qualtrics is a private company, accessible at Qualtrics.com, that provides software 
for creating and administering surveys and also supplies survey respondents if needed. 
 124.  A copy of one version of the survey appears in the Appendix. 
 125.  Arbitration clauses are also used in many other contracts.  Companies that have 
worked their way into the tissues of contemporary American life and whose non-credit card 
contracts contain arbitration clauses include Verizon Wireless, AT&T Mobility, Sprint, 
Skype, and PayPal.  See infra notes 195–199 and accompanying text. 
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commonplace in contemporary life.126  Estimates of the number of 
Americans with credit cards in recent years vary from 156 million to 
226 million.127  Second, a publicly-accessible database maintained by 
the CFPB includes credit card contracts in use by more than 300 
issuers.128  The database not only provided us access to an actual 
contract to use in the survey, but also enabled us to determine how the 
contract compared with other credit card contracts. 
We chose our sample credit card contract for several reasons.  
First, its arbitration clause is typical of arbitration clauses commonly 
found in credit card contracts with arbitration clauses.129  The 
arbitration clause included a small claims court exclusion,130 class 
                                                          
 126.  Credit cards have been used in the United States since the 1950s.  See Tom Brown 
& Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not So Crazy, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 68–70 
(2006) (detailing the history of credit cards in the United States). 
 127.  See, e.g., KEVIN FOSTER ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, THE 2008 
SURVEY OF CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE 56 (2008) (estimating that 176.8 million Ameri-
can consumers have credit cards); SCOTT SCHUH & JOANNA STAVINS, FED. RESERVE BANK 
OF BOSTON 2011 AND 2012 SURVEYS OF CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE 28 (2014), 
http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/rdr/2014/rdr1401.pdf (reporting that in 2012, 72.1% of 
consumers had credit cards, meaning that approximately 226 million people had credit 
cards); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: TABLE 1188. CREDIT 
CARDS—HOLDERS, NUMBER, SPENDING, AND DEBT, 2000 AND 2009, AND PROJECTIONS, 
2012 (2012),  http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1188.pdf (reporting 
156 million American credit card holders in 2009 and projecting 160 million for 2012).  The 
percentage of American households with a general purpose credit card varied from 60% to 
74% during 2009–2011.  During the same period, between a third and 41% of households 
had a private label revolving store card.  See MERCATOR ADVISORY GRP., U.S. CREDIT 
CARDHOLDERS: WAITING FOR A REBOUND 9 (2011).  Americans held more than 750 million 
Visa and MasterCard accounts alone in 2011.  Id. at 10. 
 128.  The database, mandated by 15 U.S.C. § 1632(d)(3), is http://www.consum-
erfinance.gov/credit-cards/agreements/.  Issuers with fewer than 10,000 open credit card ac-
counts are not required to provide copies to the Bureau.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.58(c)(5)(1) (2015). 
 129.  As for the prevalence of arbitration clauses in credit card contracts, the CFPB found 
that half of all credit card loans outstanding as of the end of 2012 were on credit cards subject 
to arbitration clauses.  CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46.  The number might have 
been higher but for consent decrees entered into by certain banks which had collectively 
issued 86.8% of the credit cards without arbitration clauses.  Id. at 55.  The consent decrees 
blocked signatory credit card issuers from inserting arbitration clauses in their credit card 
contracts.  See supra notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text.  The relevant portions of the 
consent decrees have since expired and we do not know if the banks involved have added 
arbitration clauses to their credit card contracts.  The CFPB also reported that 17% of credit 
card issuers include arbitration clauses while 83% did not; the disparity between the number 
of issuers using arbitration clauses and the percentage of credit card loans subject to arbitra-
tion clauses is accounted for by the fact that larger credit card issuers are more likely to use 
arbitration clauses.  CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 21. 
 130.  The CFPB study found that 66.7% of the credit card arbitration clauses it examined 
included small claims carve-outs.  CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 32. 
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action waiver,131 jury trial waiver,132 choice of the American Arbitration 
Association (“AAA”) or JAMS as the arbitration provider,133 and 
designation of the FAA as the governing law. 
Second, we wanted to use both an arbitration agreement and a 
survey instrument that were not unduly difficult to read.  In particular, 
we wanted an arbitration clause that would be no harder for consumers 
to read than the typical credit card arbitration clause.  The CFPB study 
of credit card arbitration clauses found their mean length to be 1098 
words and their median length to be 1074 words.134  The arbitration 
clause in our contract contained 615 words and therefore required less 
reading time than the average credit card arbitration clause.  We also 
tested the contract using the Flesch Reading Ease Formula135 and the 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Score,136 two widely used tests of 
readability.  On each scale, the arbitration clause in the contract we 
selected was slightly more readable than both the mean and median 
credit card arbitration clause, according to the CFPB data.137 
We also wanted to use a contract that was not excessively lengthy.  
The agreement we selected covered seven pages.  In comparison, a 
Boeing Employees Credit Union contract runs nineteen to twenty-one 
                                                          
 131.  The CFPB study found that 93.9% of the credit card arbitration clauses included 
class action waivers.  Id. at 37. 
 132.  The CFPB study found that 92.5% of credit card arbitration clauses stated that ar-
bitration precluded jury trials.  Id. at 52. 
 133. The CFPB study found that 83.3% of the credit card arbitration clauses listed AAA 
as a provider and 40.9% listed JAMS as a provider.  Id. at 34. 
 134.  Id. at 28. 
 135.  See Rudolf Flesch, A New Readability Yardstick, 32 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 221, 230 
(1948).  The Flesch Formula produces a score based on such factors as the average number 
of words per sentence and the average number of syllables per word.  A Flesch-Kincaid 
Grade Level Score below fifty is considered difficult reading; 50 to 60 is regarded as fairly 
difficult while scores in the sixties are labeled standard.  Id. 
 136.  See generally J. PETER KINCAID ET AL., NAVAL TECHNICAL TRAINING COMMAND, 
DERIVATION OF NEW READABILITY FORMULAS (AUTOMATED READABILITY INDEX, FOG 
COUNT AND FLESCH READING EASE FORMULA) FOR NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL 4–5, 14 
(1975), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a006655.pdf (explaining how the different 
readability indexes are calculated); Norman E. Plate, Do as I Say, Not as I Do: A Report 
Card on Plain Language in the United States Supreme Court, 13 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & 
CLINICAL L. 80, 93–94 (2010).  The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Score uses the same inputs 
as the Flesch Formula but assigns texts a grade level based on difficulty.  Id.   
 137.  The CFPB found that the mean Flesch readability test score for arbitration clauses 
was 34.5 and the median was 33.7.  CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 28–29.  
Our arbitration clause came in at 35.4, meaning that it is slightly more readable than both the 
mean and median credit card arbitration clause.  The CFPB also reported that the mean 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score for credit card arbitration clauses was 14.2 and the median 
grade level was 14.7.  Id. at 29.  Our arbitration clause’s Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Score 
was 14.0, again indicating that it is slightly more readable than both the mean and median 
credit card contract arbitration clause. 
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pages,138 while a USAA Savings Bank agreement spans nineteen 
pages.139  To determine if our contract was of a typical length, we asked 
two research assistants to record the length of credit card contracts that 
included arbitration clauses in the CFPB database.  For issuers with 
multiple contracts in the database, we asked the research assistants to 
use only the first contract in the database.  According to their research, 
the mean length of the contracts with arbitration clauses was 9.15 pages 
while the median was seven.140 
We sought a contract in which the arbitration clause was at least 
as conspicuous as that in a typical credit card contract.  The clause in 
our contract was printed in bold, and the provisions informing 
consumers that they waive the rights to sue in court, participate in a 
class action, have a jury trial, and appeal the arbitrator’s decision 
appeared in italics and ALLCAPS.  The second page of our contract 
(the first page of text after the so-called Schumer Box disclosures) also 
included a bold face reference to the arbitration clause and class action 
waiver and urged consumers to read the arbitration clause carefully.  
Our research assistants’ survey of arbitration clauses found that only 
14% had such a statement early in the contract.  The arbitration clause 
in our contract began on page six, as compared to a mean beginning 
page in the credit card contracts checked of 5.8 and a median beginning 
page of four.  The research assistants reported that in 37% of the 
contracts, the arbitration clause began after page six.141 
We were also concerned with the readability of the survey itself, 
as well as of the consent form.  Both the consent form and survey 
                                                          
 138.  BOEING EMPS. CREDIT UNION, CREDIT AND SECURITY AGREEMENT (2013), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/a/assets/credit-card-agreements/pdf/creditcardagree-
ment_9599.pdf. 
 139.  USAA SAV. BANK, USAA CREDIT CARD AGREEMENT, http://files.consum-
erfinance.gov/a/assets/credit-card-agreements/pdf/creditcardagreement_6316.pdf. 
 140.  We tested the portion of the contract other than the arbitration agreement for read-
ability as well.  The CFPB found the mean Flesch readability score for the non-arbitration 
clause portion of credit card contracts with arbitration clauses to be 52.2 and the median 
51.6.  CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 29.  Ours was 46.5, signaling it was 
somewhat harder to read.  The CFPB reported that the mean Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level 
Score for the non-arbitration term portions of credit card contracts with arbitration clauses 
was 10.8 with a median of 11.0.  Id.  Ours was 12.6, again meaning that it was somewhat 
harder to read.  We judged these differences to be acceptable because we were concerned 
with the arbitration clause rather than the rest of the contract and also because the balance of 
the sample contract was still easier going than arbitration clauses. 
 141.  We found it necessary to make some formatting changes in the sample contract.  
We replaced the name of the issuing bank with ABC Bank, and redacted the issuing bank’s 
contact information.  To accommodate the limitations of the survey software, we had to 
change the pagination of certain sections of the contract.  None of the formatting changes 
altered the arbitration clause or its placement within the contract. 
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questions had readability scores indicating that they should be easily 
comprehensible by tenth graders and seventh graders, respectively.142  
They were considerably more readable than credit card contracts with 
arbitration clauses.143  We also put the survey through two rounds of 
tests before deploying it broadly.  In the first phase, we administered 
the survey to eighty-five friends, family members, and acquaintances to 
whom we had not previously mentioned that we were studying 
arbitration clauses.144  We were particularly concerned about the length 
of the questions, which were longer than we would have preferred, 
despite our collective decades of experience drafting examination 
questions for law students.145  Nevertheless, no respondents indicated 
that they found the survey questions confusing or that they did not 
understand them. 
Most of the respondents in the first phase had taken at least some 
college courses.  That left us concerned that we had not adequately 
tested whether less educated consumers might have difficulty 
understanding the survey questions.  Accordingly, for phase two we 
asked Qualtrics to supply a panel of respondents who had not gone 
beyond completing high school.  Qualtrics found twenty-six 
respondents to take the survey in phase two, of whom three had not 
graduated from high school; the remainder had not progressed beyond 
a high school diploma.  Again, the respondents did not indicate 
difficulty understanding the questions. 
Finally, we had concerns about the appearance of the contract.  
The process of reproducing the contract in the survey necessarily made 
the appearance of the printed text marginally less “crisp” than it appears 
on the printed page, though we note that we found it completely 
readable.  While the font on the screen when not zoomed in was small, 
it was slightly larger than the font of the actual contract in the CFPB 
database when printed out.  We dealt with this by instructing 
respondents to enlarge the text on their monitor if they had difficulty 
                                                          
 142.  The consent form’s Flesch readability score was 48.2, while the survey’s was 67.5.  
The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Scores were 10.1 and 7.1, respectively. 
 143.  See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 144.  We offered to compensate phase one respondents by paying them $5 for their re-
sponses, though not all of the respondents took us up on the offer. 
 145.  In the first phase, the survey included the following instruction: “We are still per-
fecting the survey, so if you see anything that confuses you or you don’t understand, please 
indicate that in the places for comments.” 
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reading.146  In any event, of the 668 respondents, only 34, or 5%, 
complained about the print.147 
B.  Survey Implementation 
We obtained a sample of survey participants that was 
demographically representative of the approximately 246,513,378 
people over the age of eighteen residing in the United States148 with 
respect to age,149 education,150 income151 and ethnicity.152  Figures 1 
through 4 provide additional information about the demographics of the 
respondents.  Because our goal was to determine consumers’ 
understanding of arbitration clauses generally, rather than their 
understanding of credit card agreements only, we did not attempt to 
obtain a sample that reflects credit card holders specifically.  
Ultimately, we obtained 668 responses, though not all respondents 
answered every multiple choice question.  If our sample was truly 
                                                          
 146.  Specifically, the instructions stated: “If you need to make the print size bigger, 
please use your browser’s controls to do so (in Explorer, click “View” and then use “Zoom” 
to make your selection).” 
 147.  We are not sure how seriously to take those complaints.  Some may reflect a certain 
tedium respondents felt in responding to the survey rather than a genuine difficulty reading 
the font.  For example, one respondent noted: “Too many pages, small print, found my mind 
wondering about other things while I was trying to read, [j]ust started to [sic] things so I 
could hurry and finish.” Another respondent wrote: “Font size made it more challenging to 
see details,” but also claimed to have read and understood most of the contract; when asked 
to identify five items from the contract, that respondent recalled ten, including the arbitration 
clause and several other terms that appeared in the text, as opposed to the Schumer Box.  We 
were not present to see the contract on the monitors of the respondents and so cannot be 
certain how it appeared.  Thus, it is possible that some responses were affected by the print 
quality. 
 148.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICK FACTS, http://quick-
facts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited June 24, 2014). 
 149.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
2012, https://www.census.gov/population/age/data/2012comp.html (last visited June 18, 
2014). 
 150.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 
2013 – DETAILED TABLES, http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/educa-
tion/data/cps/2013/tables.html (last visited June 18, 2014). 
 151.  See LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME AND THE MIDDLE CLASS 2 (2012), http://assets.open-
crs.com/rpts/RS20811_20121113.pdf (listing the distribution of household income by in-
come class for 2011). 
 152.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS,  http://quickfacts.cen-
sus.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited June 18, 2014). 
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random, that number of respondents should give us a 95% confidence 
level of a 4% margin of error.153 
We know, of course, that our sample was not truly random.  Any 
survey necessarily excludes people who refuse to answer surveys.  In 
addition, as with most web-based surveys, selection bias in the sample 
population of survey participants might distort the results.154  A web-
based survey excludes the 15% of adults who do not use the Internet at 
all.155  That population is skewed towards older Americans because 
44% of those over the age of sixty-five do not use the Internet.156  While 
our respondents include approximately the same percentage of elderly 
people as the general population, we cannot be certain that non-Internet 
users would respond in the same way as Internet users.  Nevertheless, 
because Internet users represent such an enormous share of the general 
population, even in the event that those who do not use the Internet 
understand arbitration clauses better than Internet users, the level of 
understanding of Internet users is worth studying and may itself serve 
as a basis for formulating public policy.157 
Another concern is that the 583 respondents supplied by 
Qualtrics—87% of the total—had previously expressed a willingness 
to answer online surveys for compensation.  We do not know what 
percentage of American adults have made such a declaration, but it is 
surely a much smaller proportion than 87%.  Nor do we know how the 
people who have stated that they are available to respond to surveys for 
remuneration might differ from the general population.  We were 
reassured when we tested for differences between the answers of the 
respondents we found and the Qualtrics respondents’ answers.  On the 
eight questions that had right and wrong answers, a t-test indicated that 
the differences were not statistically significant at the .05 level.158 
Because the survey put respondents in an artificial situation—they 
were not actually making a financial commitment based on the contract 
we gave them, among other things—we cannot be certain whether they 
                                                          
 153.  See GLENN D. ISRAEL, DETERMINING SAMPLE SIZE 4 (1992), 
https://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/PD/PD00600.pdf (using Simplified Formula for Proportions 
results in sample size of 625 to produce 95% confidence level of 4% margin of error). 
 154.  Jelke Bethlehem, Selection Bias in Web Surveys, 78 INT’L STAT. REV. 161, 
162 (2010). 
 155.  KATHRYN ZICKUHR, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHO’S NOT ONLINE AND WHY 2 
(2013), http://www.pewInternet.org/2013/09/25/whos-not-online-and-why/. 
 156.  Id. at 3. 
 157.  To the extent that Internet users may be more sophisticated than non-Internet users, 
our respondents may also have been more sophisticated than the population as a whole, sug-
gesting a greater likelihood of comprehension of the contract than would be seen in the gen-
eral population. 
 158.  The average percent of correct answers for our respondents was 27% while for the 
Qualtrics respondents it was 25%. 
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gave the contract the same degree of scrutiny they would give a similar 
contract they received as part of a real-world transaction.  The survey 
provided the following instructions immediately before the contract: 
Imagine that you obtained a credit card and the credit card 
company has provided you with the credit card contract we 
are about to show you, perhaps online or through the mail.  If 
you have a credit card, you have been given a contract like 
this for your credit card in the past.  Some consumers read 
contracts like this while others may not, and still others may 
read some parts and not other parts.  Please give this contract 
the exact same amount of attention you would if it had just 
been provided to you, along with your new credit card.  This 
is not a test.  Rather, we want to learn what you and other 
consumers take away from consumer contracts in your 
everyday life. 
Despite those instructions, respondents may have read the contract 
with more or less care than they would have read a real credit card 
contract.  They might have read it with greater care because the survey 
called their attention to the contract in a way that does not typically 
occur when consumers receive a credit card.159  Or they might have read 
it with less care because this was a simulation and did not directly 
impact them.  And, of course, consumers may not accurately assess how 
carefully they read credit card contracts in their daily lives.160 
We also feared that the Qualtrics respondents might rush through 
the survey in an attempt to collect their compensation—Qualtrics 
compensated each of its respondents who completed the survey out of 
the $7 we paid them—with a minimal time investment.  The version of 
the survey administered to the Qualtrics respondents had two main 
safeguards to insure that the respondents gave honest answers.  First, at 
Qualtrics’ recommendation, we included two “dummy” questions 
within that version of the survey to verify that respondents were giving 
the survey appropriate attention.  The first, asked shortly after 
                                                          
 159.  See MACRO INT’L INC., supra note 75 (reporting that few consumers reported that 
they read credit card contracts in their entirety and about half stated that they did not read 
them at all). 
 160.  See Davis, supra note 99, at 895.  Similar to our study, the Davis study asked re-
spondents to read the contract “as carefully as they would have read it under actual . . . 
circumstances.”  Id.  The author later asked the respondents whether they had read the con-
tract more or less carefully than they would have done in an actual transaction.  He reported 
that 49% claimed to have read it more carefully while 13% said they read it less carefully.  
Id.  The answers find some support in that those who claimed to have read the contract more 
carefully also understood the contract better than those who acknowledged reading it with 
less care.  We cannot say whether Davis’s results are generalizable to our population.  If a 
similar pattern held with our respondents, however, we would expect that the responses to 
our survey overstate consumer understanding of the contract. 
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respondents saw the credit card contract, inquired what kind of 
document the respondent had reviewed; possible answers besides 
“credit card contract” included “non-compete form,” “non-disclosure 
agreement,” and “cell phone contract.”  The 928 respondents who failed 
to provide the correct answer were excluded from the survey.  By so 
doing, it is possible that we eliminated some respondents who might 
have skipped over the contract because they do not read such contracts 
and were complying with the instruction to give the contract the same 
level of attention they would have had it been a real contract.  As a 
consequence of excluding these respondents, our results may overstate 
comprehension of the contract.  Nevertheless, we felt it best to follow 
Qualtrics’s advice given their greater experience with their respondents.  
The second question, displayed much further along in the survey, 
directed respondents to select “No” among the answers “Yes,” “No,” 
and “Sometimes.”  Only thirty-four respondents failed to click “No,” 
suggesting that the first attention check question caught most of those 
who were answering questions without reading them. 
In addition, we identified five criteria that we believe raised 
questions about whether the respondent had taken the survey seriously: 
The five criteria were that the respondent: 
 Spent less than 4.5 minutes on the survey 
 Entered gibberish 
 Finished Question 11 in less than three seconds. 
 Finished Question 19 in less than seven seconds 
 Finished Question 21 in less than twelve seconds 
The time thresholds were calculated based on reading speed.  They 
were intended to catch responses given too quickly to have allowed the 
respondent to read and answer the questions with any degree of care.  
We discarded any responses displaying at least two of the five criteria, 
ultimately discarding a total of fifty-two responses. 
V.  ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS† 
We sought to test consumer understanding of arbitration 
agreements in three ways.  First, we gave consumers a sample credit 
card contract with an arbitration clause and asked them questions about 
the sample contract.  Next, we asked consumers a series of questions 
about a hypothetical “properly-worded” credit card contract containing 
an arbitration agreement.  Finally, we asked consumers about 
arbitration agreements in actual contracts they have entered into.  At 
                                                          
† All data discussed in the following pages is described in greater detail in the attached 
Appendix.  
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each step, we gave respondents space to add comments.  For each of 
those three contexts, the survey results show significant consumer 
misunderstandings of what consumers agreed to and what effect those 
agreements have on consumers’ procedural rights. 
We begin our analysis by examining the extent to which our 
respondents read the sample contract and focused on the arbitration 
clause.  Then we turn to the terms of the sample contract and a set of 
questions that explored respondents’ understanding and beliefs about 
the dispute resolution terms.  Next, we turn to questions that asked 
consumers about a hypothetical contract containing a “properly-
worded” arbitration clause, as opposed to the sample contract.  Finally, 
we discuss questions asking about whether consumers had previously 
entered into arbitration agreements. 
A.  The Extent to Which Consumers Read the Agreement and 
Focused on the Arbitration Clause 
Respondents were given the sample contract before seeing any 
questions and with no prompting to focus on any particular contract 
provisions.  We asked them to spend the same amount of time reading 
the contract as they would any other consumer contract they might 
encounter in their real-world transactions.161  The results suggest most 
respondents did not read the contract in detail, and few focused on the 
arbitration clause. 
1.  Did Respondents Read the Contract? 
The contract as a whole contained 9118 words.  The average adult 
is reported to read less than 300 words of prose per minute.162  
                                                          
 161.  The survey provided respondents the following instructions about reading the con-
tract: 
Imagine that you obtained a credit card and the credit card company has provided 
you with the credit card contract we are about to show you, perhaps online or 
through the mail.  If you have a credit card, you have been given a contract like 
this for your credit card in the past.  Some consumers read contracts like this while 
others may not, and still others may read some parts and not other parts.  Please 
give this contract the exact same amount of attention you would if it had just been 
provided to you, along with your new credit card.  This is not a test.  Rather, we 
want to learn what you and other consumers take away from consumer contracts 
in your everyday life. 
 162.  See Jessica Love, Reading Fast and Slow, THE AM. SCHOLAR (Mar. 1, 2012), 
http://theamericanscholar.org/reading-fast-and-slow/#.U72muagm5l8 (“In practice, most of 
us read about 250 words per minute.”); Mark Thomas, What Is the Average Reading Speed 
and the Best Rate of Reading?, HEALTH GUIDANCE,  http://www.healthguidance.org/en-
try/13263/1/What-Is-the-Average-Reading-Speed-and-the-Best-Rate-of-Reading.html (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2015) (“On a broader spectrum, an adult reads about 250 words per minute 
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Assuming a reading speed of 300 words per minute, a person should 
have taken more than thirty minutes to read the contract in full.  But 
that may be misleading because a consumer reading the contract might 
be expected to skip over some sections after reading the caption, 
depending on how the consumer planned to use a credit card.  For 
example, a consumer who rarely traveled overseas might reasonably not 
read the section captioned “Using Your Card for International 
Transactions,” while a consumer who did not expect to write checks 
against the account would probably see little value in perusing the 
section headed “Convenience Checks.”  In any event, respondents spent 
an average of 263.2 seconds, or just over four minutes, on the pages 
containing the contract.  Assuming a reading speed of 300 words per 
minute, that translates into enough time to read 1311.6 words, or 14% 
of the contract.163 
Four minutes may overstate the amount of time respondents spent 
reading the contract.  While the survey platform timed how long 
respondents spent on each page of the contract, we cannot determine 
how much of that time was spent reading.  Respondents could, for 
example, have clicked to open a page and then shifted their attention to 
something else.  We have at least two reasons to believe some 
respondents were distracted.  First, some respondents took hours—even 
a day—from the time they first opened the survey to the time they 
finished it.164  It seems obvious that those respondents were not 
devoting all that time continuously to the survey.  Second, the average 
respondent spent more time on the last page of the contract than any 
other page—100 seconds, or more than four times longer than several 
other pages—despite the fact that the last page contained less text.165  A 
                                                          
on an average.  On the other hand, a college student reads about 300 words per minute on an 
average.” (alterations omitted)). 
 163.  This contrasts with the results of a survey reported in Tess Wilkinson-Ryan’s A 
Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print.  Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 86, at 1774.  
In Professor Wilkinson-Ryan’s survey, respondents were asked to estimate how long they 
would spend reading a three-page credit card contract.  It appears that they were not given a 
copy of the contract.  The mean amount of time respondents said they would devote to read-
ing the contract was 10.6 minutes and they would read only about two-thirds of the contract.  
They also estimated that the average consumer would read it for 6.1 minutes and read one-
third.  The average respondent also stated that he or she would spend 12.4 minutes reading 
a six-page computer contract and 14.2 minutes reading a twenty-page car warranty. 
 164.  For example, some respondents took the following length of time to complete the 
survey: one day, four hours, twenty-five minutes; five hours, forty-nine minutes; one day, 
ten hours, twenty minutes; fifteen hours, five minutes; five hours, ten minutes; seven hours, 
twelve minutes. 
 165.  The first page of text (page two of the contract) had 1174 words.  The succeeding 
pages had 1574, 1705, 1583, 1617, and 1001 words, respectively.  The last page told re-
spondents “[w]hen you are finished with this page, please click the arrow at the bottom right 
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likely explanation is that many respondents took a break between 
finishing the last page and proceeding to the survey questions.  In any 
event, we can put an outer limit on the amount of time respondents spent 
reading the contract, though we cannot determine how much time they 
actually devoted to reading it. 
Figure 5 shows the breakdown of average time spent per page on 
the contract, how many words appeared on each page, and what 
percentage of the page someone reading 300 words per minute could 
have read in the time the average respondent spent on the page.  On 
average, respondents spent 34.03 seconds on page two of the contract, 
which included a bolded reference to the arbitration clause, 19.27 
seconds on page six of the contract, which contained the first part of the 
arbitration clause, and 100 seconds on the last page, which included the 
remainder of the arbitration clause, for a total of 153.3 seconds, or more 
than two and a half minutes, on pages referring to arbitration.  Again, 
that number is probably inflated by respondents who took a break upon 
reaching the last page of the contract.  Even the amount of time 
respondents spent on a single page of the contract compares favorably 
with the nominal amount of time some studies have found that 
consumers spend reading contracts in real transactions.  For example, 
one study found that less than .5% of consumers spent even one second 
on EULAs,166 while another reported that about half the participants 
stated that they did not read credit card contracts at all.167  Thus, it may 
be that respondents spent more time with the contract than consumers 
normally do and that their responses actually overstate consumer 
understanding of arbitration clauses. 
It is impossible to know how much time respondents spent 
specifically on the arbitration clause.  The instructions did not refer to 
the arbitration clause, and so, just as with any arbitration term in a credit 
card contract, respondents would have had no special reason to pay 
attention to the arbitration clause—except that this contract included a 
boldface reference to the arbitration clause on page two of the contract.  
Page two also advised respondents: “It is important that you read the 
entire Arbitration Provision section carefully.”  The arbitration clause 
ran 615 words.  At 300 words per minute, it would have taken just over 
two minutes to read.  Page six included 383 words of the arbitration 
clause and 232 more appeared on page seven.  We can infer from the 
fact that the average respondent spent no more than 19.27 seconds 
reading page six that the average respondent did not read the entire 
                                                          
of the survey to move on to the survey questions” so respondents would have been able to 
tell it was the final page of the contract. 
 166.  Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 71. 
 167.  See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
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arbitration provision, much less heed the advice to read it “carefully.”  
Reading the portion of the arbitration clause that appeared on page six 
in its entirety would have taken a 300-word-a-minute reader more than 
one minute and fifteen seconds, or nearly four times as much as the 
average respondent spent on all of page six.  These calculations assume 
that such a respondent read nothing else on page six. 
We cannot, however, determine whether the average respondent 
read the entire segment of the arbitration clause that appeared on page 
seven because the 100 seconds the average respondent devoted to that 
page would have been more than enough to read the page-seven portion 
of the arbitration clause.  It seems unlikely, however, that a respondent 
would speed through the page-six fragment of the arbitration clause and 
then read the page-seven part carefully.  Perhaps more importantly, the 
key parts of the arbitration clause—at least for purposes of this study—
all appear on page six.  Specifically, the text barring suit in a non-small 
claims court, banning class actions, prohibiting jury trials, and 
addressing the finality of the arbitrator’s decision appeared on page six.  
We would expect that if respondents spent more time on one part of the 
arbitration clause than another, it would be on the parts that appeared in 
italics and ALLCAPS, all of which were on page six. 
We also asked respondents how long they would spend reading a 
contract like the sample contract.168  Figure 6 shows the distribution of 
responses.  We found a weak, but significant, correlation (at the .05 
level) between the actual time spent reading the contract and the time 
respondents reported (correlation coefficient = 0.25).  Because 
respondents answered Question 15 after reading the contract, their 
answers might have been affected by their perception of how long they 
spent reading it. 
                                                          
 168.  Question 15 asked respondents the following: 
Before you use a credit card, the company should provide you with a contract like the one 
you just saw.  If the contract is the same length as the one you just saw, we would like to 
know how much time you would spend reading it.  Which of the following is true? 
I would probably not read the contract. 
I would probably spend a minute or less reading the contract. 
I would probably spend more than one minute but no more than three minutes reading the 
contract. 
I would probably spend more than three minutes reading the contract. 
I don’t know. 
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FIGURE 6 
 
 
Respondents’ comments are instructive about their attitudes 
toward consumer contracts, suggesting several reasons why consumers 
do not carefully read contracts.  Some examples follow, with the 
amount of time respondents said they would spend reading contracts of 
this type appearing in brackets after each quote: 
 I would loose [sic] attention before I finished reading 
the contract.  [less than one minute] 
 I know it’s irresponsible not to fully read contracts, 
but unfortunately I assume that there would be 
nothing in there that would be unusual or that I would 
never need to think about it.   [one to three minutes] 
 bunch of meaningless crap [would not read] 
 I would probably ask questions to the issuer rather 
than reading the contract word by word.  [one to three 
minutes] 
 Focus mostly on the first page.  You cannot live 
(really) without credit cards, and you cannot get one 
without agreeing—so . . . not much you can do about 
it anyway.  [one to three minutes] 
 I trust the laws of the land to not permit a business to 
take advantage of consumers, so I do trust that, in 
good faith, the contracts are not very detrimental.  
[one to three minutes] 
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 I would spend time reading it but I wouldn’t 
necessarily know what a lot of it meant.  [more than 
three minutes] 
 I feel like I know what to look for in this type of an 
agreement and would speak with a banker as well 
about it.  [one to three] 
 I guess it really depends.  I don’t have a credit card 
so I might feel a little more dedicated if I knew it was 
real. (sorry, I know you told me to pretend.) [one to 
three] 
 contract is much too long, they could probably make 
it shorter so people could understand it [one to three] 
As noted above, the survey also asked respondents how much of 
the contract they had read and understood.  We found a significant (at 
the .05 level) but very weak correlation between the actual time spent 
and the amount reportedly read and understood (correlation 
coefficient = .15). 
In sum, it appears that many respondents did not spend enough 
time on the contract to read it carefully, and that many respondents did 
not read the arbitration clause carefully despite the contract’s 
admonition to do so. 
2.  Did Respondents Notice and Recall the Arbitration Clause? 
Even if consumers only skim boilerplate, they might have a 
particular interest in arbitration or in their dispute resolution options 
more generally.  They might pay more attention to arbitration clauses 
than to other provisions.  Or the converse might be true: consumers may 
focus more on other terms than on arbitration, suggesting that dispute 
resolution procedures are not an important factor in consumer 
decisionmaking. 
To test the salience of the arbitration clause within the contract, 
we asked an open-ended question about which terms the respondents 
recalled.  The first question respondents saw after the contract read as 
follows: 
The credit card contract you just saw said many things.  We 
would like to know what you remember.  Please put down a 
word or phrase for five items you recall.  You do not need to 
repeat the actual words.  For example, if you remember 
seeing the annual fee term, you can simply write “annual 
fee.”  If you don’t remember five items, please mention as 
many or as few as you do remember. 
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Respondents collectively made 1975 entries, and recorded an 
average number of just under three items.  That includes references to 
nineteen items that do not actually appear in the contract.169 
We had a research assistant tabulate and collate the responses.  
That task necessarily involved some interpretation, and we recognize 
that others might have coded the responses differently.170  In any event, 
we counted mentions of 263 different items from the contract, though 
only 119 of those were listed by more than one respondent.  Figure 7 
shows that only eighteen respondents explicitly referred to arbitration, 
though five others cited items that seem drawn from the arbitration 
clause: “class action info,” “you or we can’t go to jury or trial,” “federal 
court decisions for disputes,” “[y]ou do not have a right as a 
representative, “and “JAMS as a contact.”171  Including these 
statements with references to the arbitration clause, the arbitration 
clause was mentioned twenty-three times, by about 3% of the 
respondents, and consisted of 1% of the total mentions.  Arbitration tied 
for fourteenth in frequency of the items referred to. Figure 7a lists the 
twenty items most often mentioned. 
As might have been expected, nearly all the most frequently listed 
items appeared in the Schumer Box, which took up the first page of the 
contract.  Two items that did not appear in the Schumer Box were cited 
as often as or more frequently than arbitration.  One was cancellation, 
which drew 26 mentions.  Its heading was bolded, though the term was 
not otherwise in bold print.  The other item was the minimum payment, 
which appeared on page four; neither its heading nor the term itself 
appeared in bold print.  Some 23 respondents mentioned it. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that dispute resolution 
terms–including arbitration clauses and class waivers—are not among 
the more important provisions to consumers.172  There are several 
                                                          
 169.  Two such examples are “401k” and “ARM.” 
 170.  For example, we coded references to “APR,” “DPR,” and “interest rates” without 
more as “interest rate (unspecified).”  We thought that more accurate than coding them as 
three different items. 
 171.  JAMS was an authorized arbitration provider under the arbitration clause.  “Federal 
court decisions for disputes” could be a reference to the provision in the arbitration clause 
stating: “This Arbitration Provision shall be governed by federal law, including the Federal 
Arbitration Act . . . .” [previous sentence written in bold font]  “You do not have a right as a 
representative” could be a reference to the arbitration clause statement: “YOU WILL NOT 
HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF ANY 
CLASS OF CLAIMANTS . . . .” [previous sentence written in bold font]. 
 172.  This conclusion is also supported by the CFPB Study, which found: 
  When asked an open-ended question regarding all the features that factored 
into their decision to get the credit card that they use most often for personal use, 
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possible explanations for these findings.  Consumers may not have 
strong preferences among dispute resolution mechanisms because they 
believe the likelihood of ending up in a dispute is very small, or because 
they believe all dispute resolution mechanisms are basically similar.  
Alternatively, consumers may have preferences as to dispute resolution 
processes but may feel powerless to effect those preferences and so 
accept whatever terms are offered.  Or they may mistakenly believe that 
their preferences will be honored regardless of the text of the 
agreement.  We believe the results described in the next two sections 
suggest that consumers do have preferences, which they express in 
terms of expectations—consumers expect to have access to court 
regardless of the terms of their agreements. 
Compounding the problem is the phenomenon of information 
overload—the tendency of consumer decisionmaking to degrade when 
consumers consider too many items.173  While the exact number of such 
                                                          
no consumers volunteered an answer that even implicitly referenced dispute res-
olutions procedures; and 
  When presented with a list of nine features of credit cards . . . and asked to 
identify those features that factored into their decision, consumers identified dis-
pute resolution procedures as being relevant less often than any of the other eight 
options. 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 120, § 3 at 3. 
 173.  See, e.g., Byung-Kwan Lee & Wei-Na Lee, The Effect of Information Overload on 
Consumer Choice Quality in an On-Line Environment, 21 PSYCHOL. & MKTG. 159, 177 
(2004) (finding that increasing “the number of attributes from 9 to 18 significantly imposed 
information overload on subjects and led to negative effect[s] on choice quality”).  See gen-
erally John C. Bergstrom & John R. Stoll, An Analysis of Information Overload with Impli-
cations for Survey Design Research, 12 LEISURE SCI. 265 (1990); Kevin Lane Keller & 
Richard Staelin, Effects of Quality and Quantity of Information of Decision Effectiveness, 14 
J. CONSUMER RES. 200, 211 (1987); Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer 
Decision Making, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 419 (1982).  Early studies included Jacob Jacoby et 
al., Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Information Load: Replication and Extension, 
1 J. CONSUMER RES. 33 (1974) and Jacob Jacoby et al., Brand Choice Behavior as a Func-
tion of Information Load, 11 J. MKTG. RES. 63 (1974).  For criticism of the early Jacoby 
studies, see, for example, Naresh K. Malhotra, Reflections on the Information Overload Par-
adigm in Consumer Decision Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 436 (1984), suggesting that 
information overload does occur but that the early Jacoby studies did not demonstrate it.  See 
also e.g., J. Edward Russo, More Information is Better: A Reevaluation of Jacoby, Speller 
and Kohn, 1 J. CONSUMER RES. 68 (1974); John O. Summers, Less Information Is Better?, 
11 J. MKTG. RES. 467, 467 (1974) (finding that the conclusion of an early Jacoby study “is 
not an accurate representation of the results of [his] study”); William L. Wilkie, Analysis of 
Effects of Information Load, 11 J. MKTG. RES. 462, 463 (1974) (re-analyzing data from 
Jacoby study and noting that “[i]t is not apparent that the results for ‘correct choices’ in fact 
reveal dysfunctional consequences with increased information load”).  For Jacoby’s replies, 
see Jacob Jacoby et al., Constructive Criticism and Programmatic Research: Reply to Russo, 
2 J. CONSUMER RES. 154 (1975) and Jacob Jacoby, Information Load and Decision Quality: 
Some Contested Issues, 14 J. MKTG. RES. 569 (1977).  For studies rebutting the information 
overload effect, see Naresh K. Malhotra et al., The Information Overload Controversy: An 
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items varies across studies, and may even vary from consumer to 
consumer, the problem itself is well-documented.174  At least for credit 
card agreements, with the number of terms already required in the 
Schumer Box, consumers may simply face too much information to 
absorb and understand arbitration terms.  The available research 
suggests that consumers choosing among credit cards are unlikely to 
consider fourteen card attributes, and so it is improbable that consumers 
would think about arbitration clauses in deciding which agreement to 
enter. 
B.  Consumer Understanding of the Sample Agreement 
The most important provisions in the arbitration clause of the 
sample contract were, first, the basic requirement that disputes be 
resolved in arbitration and the concomitant prohibition on litigation in 
court, with the exception of litigation in small claims court; and second, 
the preclusion of class actions and other mechanisms for pursuing 
multiple claims in a single proceeding.  We found deep 
misunderstandings on both those points. 
                                                          
Alternative Viewpoint, 46 J. MKTG. 27 (1982), Thomas E. Muller, Buyer Response to Vari-
ations in Product Information Load, 69 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 300 (1984), and Debra L. 
Scammon, “Information Load” and Consumers, 4 J. CONSUMER RES. 148 (1977).  For crit-
icism of these last studies, see Jacob Jacoby, Perspectives on Information Overload, 10 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 432 (1984).  For criticism of the Keller and Staelin study cited above, see 
Robert J. Meyer & Eric J. Johnson, Information Overload and the Nonrobustness of Linear 
Models: A Comment on Keller and Staelin, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 498 (1989).  For Keller 
and Staelin’s response, see Kevin Lane Keller & Richard Staelin, Assessing Biases in Meas-
uring Decision Effectiveness and Information Overload, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 504 (1989). 
 174.  See, e.g., David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, The Irrelevance of 
Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 300 
(1986) (“Taking consumers at their word, several studies show that the number of salient or 
determinate product attributes—those considered at the final stage—does not exceed five, 
and often is less.”); Malhotra, supra note 173, at 427 (“[I]t seems that individuals cannot 
optimally handle more than ten items (attributes) of information simultaneously. . . .  There 
exists some evidence to suggest that individuals can optimally process a maximum of only 
six alternatives”); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Prob-
lem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 767–68 (2006) (“Subjects typically 
consider a maximum of five attributes . . . .  In marketing studies designed to determine 
which attributes consumers consider in making real-world product purchasing decisions, un-
der more realistic search and information processing cost conditions, consumers consider 
even fewer attributes.”); Hume Winzar & Preben Savik, Measuring the Information Over-
load on the World Wide Web, 13 AM. MKTG. ASS’N, 439, 439 (2002) (“Estimates of optimal 
number of attributes have ranged from 4 to 15 . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
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1.  Do Consumers Understand They Will Be Precluded from 
Court Adjudication? 
As an initial matter, we wanted to test whether consumers 
recognized (or assumed) that the contract they saw required them to 
arbitrate disputes they might have with the credit card company.  The 
sample credit card contract provided for arbitration of all disputes 
arising out of the contract, and included a small-claims carve-out, 
allowing disputes to be heard in small claims court but not courts having 
jurisdiction over larger claims.  Specifically, the contract provided in 
pertinent part:175 
 You agree that either you or we can choose to have binding 
arbitration resolve any claim, dispute or controversy 
between you and us that arises from or relates to this 
Agreement or the Account and credit issued thereunder 
(individually and collectively, a “Claim”).  This does not 
apply to any Claim in which the relief sought is within the 
jurisdictional limits of, and is filed in, a small claims court.  
If arbitration is chosen by any party, the following will 
apply: 
(1) NEITHER YOU NOR WE WILL HAVE THE RIGHT 
TO LITIGATE A CLAIM IN COURT . . . .176 
The contract in the survey gave respondents several opportunities 
to notice the arbitration clause.  The existence of the arbitration clause 
was pointed out on the contract’s second page (the first page of contract 
text) and the clause itself was spread over two other pages, meaning 
that the arbitration clause appeared on or was referred to on three of the 
contract’s seven pages.  The arbitration clause, as well as the reference 
to it on page two, was printed entirely in bold print, while portions of 
the clause appeared in ALLCAPS and italics, as illustrated in the quote 
from the contract just above. 
The survey’s questions about this aspect of the sample arbitration 
clause were intended to determine (1) if respondents understood that, 
under the contract, claims that could not meet the jurisdictional limits 
of a small claims court could be heard only in arbitration; and (2) if they 
understood that, under the contract, some claims could be heard in a 
small claims court. 
                                                          
 175.  Bold, italics, and ALLCAPS appeared in the original. 
 176.  Such small claims carve-outs are common in arbitration clauses, perhaps because 
the rules of the AAA provide for such a carve-out.  See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTE: SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES § C-1(d) (2005), 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules/searchrules (select “View Our Archival Rules” and nav-
igate through the alphabetic listing) (“Parties can still take their claims to a small claims 
court.”). 
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Question 11 was designed to assess whether respondents 
understood that they had agreed to arbitrate disputes too large for small 
claims court.  In other words, this question went to the most basic 
point—whether consumers realized that they had entered into an 
arbitration agreement at all.  Question 11 asked: “If you and the credit 
card company have a dispute that is too large to be brought in a small 
claims court, did the contract you just saw say you have agreed to 
arbitrate it?”177 
As shown in Figure 8, 43% of the respondents stated that they had 
agreed to arbitrate such a dispute.178  A majority of the respondents 
either thought that they had not agreed to arbitrate or did not know. 
FIGURE 8 
 
Question 7 addressed the existence of an arbitration requirement 
in a slightly different way, by asking about the procedural effect of the 
                                                          
 177.  As discussed more fully below, see infra notes 183–184 and accompanying text, 
the arbitration clause included a carve-out for small claims court proceedings. 
 178.  Our findings thus conflict with Eigen’s findings that only three of 37 employees 
recalled that their employment agreement included an arbitration clause.  See supra note 
218–219 and accompanying text.  The different results may have several explanations, in-
cluding that we asked our questions immediately after showing respondents the contract, the 
arbitration clause in our contract and the page-two  reference to it appeared in bold print and 
spilled over three of the seven pages of the contract, and the small sample in the Eigen 
study—thirty-seven employees of a single company—may have rendered the results atypi-
cal. 
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that is too large to be brought in a small claims 
court, did the contract you just saw say you have 
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agreement in the context of a specific dispute.  The question read as 
follows: 
 Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized 
the credit card company overcharged you.  The credit card 
company, however, believes it has not overcharged you and 
refuses to give you your money back.  The dispute is too large 
to be decided by a small claims court.  Under the terms of the 
contract you just saw, if the amount of the dispute was large 
enough, would you have a right to have a court decide the 
dispute even if the credit card company didn’t want a court to 
decide the dispute?179 
As noted above, the credit card contract unequivocally stated that 
such a dispute could not be heard in court and could be decided only by 
an arbitrator.  Yet, as shown in Figure 9, only 14% of the respondents 
realized that the contract banned litigation in court.180  Nearly half—or 
more than three times as many as recognized they did not have a right 
to sue in court—wrongly believed the contract gave them a right to sue 
in court.   When those who selected “I don’t know” are added in, 
consumers failed to understand that they had surrendered their right to 
sue in court by a margin of more than six to one.181 
  
                                                          
 179.  By using the phrase, “under the terms of the contract you just saw,” we sought to 
focus respondents’ attention on the wording of the contract rather than questions about en-
forceability. 
 180.  The CFPB Study found that “[l]ess than 7% of consumers whose credit card agree-
ments included pre-dispute arbitration clauses stated that they could not sue their credit card 
issuers in  court.”  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 120, § 3 at 4.  The difference 
between the CFPB’s findings and ours, though not large, may be explained in part by the 
fact that in our study, respondents were shown the credit card contract only moments before 
being asked. 
 181.  The CFPB Study reported an even larger margin.  More than 90% of the CFPB 
respondents with arbitration clauses in their credit card contracts reported either not knowing 
if they could sue in court or believed they could do so, giving a margin of more than thirteen 
to one.  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 120, § 3 at 19; see also Debra Pogrund 
Stark, Jessica M. Choplin, & Eileen Linnabery, Dysfunctional Contracts and the Laws and 
Practices that Enable Them: An Empirical Analysis, 46 IND. L. REV. 797, 799 (2013) (study 
finds that “a very large percentage of laypersons believed they were entitled to remedies that 
were ‘clearly’ (at least to an attorney or judge’s eyes) excluded in the contract clause”). 
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FIGURE 9 
 
 
In conjunction, Questions 11 and 7 show that many respondents 
who either realized or assumed that the contract provided for arbitration 
were confused about what that meant.  Of the 43% who said that the 
contract provided for arbitration, 61% also believed that consumers 
would have a right to have a court decide the dispute.  Nearly a fifth of 
those who believed that the contract mandated arbitration checked “I 
don’t know” when asked if consumers would have a right to sue in court 
by Question 7.  In short, only fifty-nine respondents—less than 9% of 
the total—realized that the contract both provided for arbitration and 
precluded litigation in court.182  An even smaller subset of the 43%, 
forty-six (less than 7% of the total), recognized that the contract 
foreclosed participation in a class action, and that it included an 
arbitration clause.183 
                                                          
 182.  Similarly, of the 43% who understood that the contract specified that disputes would 
be resolved through arbitration, only eighty respondents realized that they could not obtain 
a jury trial, meaning that only 12% of the total understood both that the contract provided 
for arbitration and that it precluded a jury trial of disputes. 
 183.  For anecdotal evidence that consumers do not understand arbitration agreements, 
see FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN 
DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 42 (2010) (“Many consumer advocates 
at the roundtables stated that consumers generally do not know that their contracts contain 
arbitration provisions. . . .  Other roundtable participants questioned whether consumers who 
are aware of the arbitration provisions in their contracts actually understand them . . . .”). 
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The comments provided by some respondents confirm that many 
were confused about the right to go to court under the contract.  While 
many reported skipping over the arbitration section of the contract, 
some respondents clearly suffered from misconceptions: 
 It would be decided by a mediator. 
 You always have a right to pursue legal action when 
someone has wronged you.  It is not up to one party or 
another to decide whether or not they will take away that 
right. 
 I did not read this information but I would expect that 
[suing in a non-small claims court] would be my right as 
a free citizen of the U.S. 
 I feel it would be necessary and very legal to do so [sue 
in a non-small claims court]. 
 I believe it is your American right to sue in larger court 
systems. 
Significantly, respondents were much more likely to believe that 
smaller value disputes could be peremptorily diverted to arbitration.  
Question 5 asked consumers about the small-claims exclusion 
contained in the contract: 
 Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized 
the credit card company overcharged you.  The credit card 
company, however, believes it has not overcharged you and 
refuses to give you your money back.  Under the terms of the 
contract you just saw, would you have the right to sue the 
credit card company in small claims court? 
Figure 10 shows the responses to the question.  Though more 
respondents clicked “no” than “yes,” the difference is within the 
survey’s margin of error.  But when the respondents who chose “I don’t 
know” are added to those incorrectly denying small claims court 
jurisdiction, the number of respondents who realized that they could sue 
in small claims court was outweighed by the number who did not by 
nearly three to one: 72% to 28%.184 
                                                          
 184.  To clarify, those answering “I don’t know” evidently do not realize that they could 
sue. 
Sovern et.al. FinalReviewWithAppendix 10/4/2015  12:06 AM 
2015] WHIMSY LITTLE CONTRACTS 49 
FIGURE 10 
 
Thus, the survey respondents had it exactly backward.  Though the 
arbitration clause barred consumers from suing in a non-small claims 
court and allowed suit in small claims courts, many respondents seemed 
to believe the reverse was true.  Twice as many respondents incorrectly 
thought they were blocked from suing in court for small claims as 
correctly realized they were precluded from suing in court for claims 
too large for small claims court.  Similarly, nearly twice as many 
incorrectly thought they could sue in court for larger claims as believed, 
correctly, that they could sue in court for smaller claims.  Only ten, or 
less than 2%, of the 667 respondents answering both questions 
understood correctly that the contract took away the right to sue in court 
for larger claims while preserving the right to sue in court for small 
claims. 
A question we asked about the right to a jury trial further 
demonstrates that our respondents did not understand the effect of the 
arbitration agreement.  The contract specified in bold, italics, and 
ALLCAPS that, in the event either party chose arbitration, neither party 
would be entitled to a jury trial: “NEITHER YOU NOR WE WILL 
HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE A CLAIM IN COURT OR TO HAVE 
A JURY TRIAL ON A CLAIM, OR TO ENGAGE IN PRE-
ARBITRATION DISCOVERY, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE 
APPLICABLE ARBITRATION RULES.” 
The survey asked respondents the following question about jury 
trials: 
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Q5: Would you have the right to sue the credit card   
company in small claims court? (N = 667)
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 Suppose after you use the credit card, the credit card 
company says you owe them more than you think you owe 
them.  Suppose also you refuse to pay the amount they say 
you owe, and they bring a claim against you to collect that 
amount.  Assume the dispute is too large to be decided by a 
small claims court.  Under the terms of the contract you just 
saw, would you have a right to a jury trial if the amount was 
large enough?  
FIGURE 11 
 
 
As Figure 11 illustrates, less than one in five respondents 
recognized that those agreeing to the contract surrendered their right to 
a jury trial.185  Nearly twice as many incorrectly answered “yes” as 
correctly answered “no.”  Again, many respondents stated in their 
comments that they had not read that portion of the contract, but some 
of the comments suggest that respondents did not realize that they could 
waive their right to a jury trial: “It is your right as an American to have 
                                                          
 185.  In practice, debt collection claims against consumers are often brought in court.  
Since 2009, AAA has maintained a self-imposed moratorium on consumer debt collection 
arbitrations, removing the largest provider from the field.  Press Release, Am. Arbitration 
Ass’n, The American Arbitration Association Calls for Reform of Debt Collection Arbitra-
tion (July 23, 2009),  https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/arbitration/testimonysept09-ex-
hibit3.pdf.  Further, since most consumers default on debt claims against them, banks may 
prefer litigation to arbitration for debt collection even where arbitration is available.  Never-
theless, consumers give up the right to a jury trial when they agree to an arbitration clause 
like the one in our study, and our results indicate they do so unknowingly. 
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a trial by a jury of your peers;” “Binding arbitrators are stipulated, 
right?  I GUESS that stipulation could be contested, THEN we’d get a 
jury trial.” 
2.  Do Consumers Understand They Cannot Participate in 
Class Actions? 
The supplied contract addressed class actions on two different 
pages.  On the second page of the contract (the first page of text), the 
second paragraph opened with the bolded words, “This Agreement 
contains an arbitration provision (including a class action arbitration 
waiver).” 
And on page six, in bold, italics, and ALLCAPS, appeared, “YOU 
WILL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A 
REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OF CLAIMANTS, 
OR AS A PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL.” 
To test respondents’ understanding of class action waivers, we 
asked Question 13: “Suppose that you and many other consumers had 
the same kind of dispute with the credit card company.  Under the terms 
of the contract you just saw, could you be included with the other 
consumers in a single lawsuit (that is, a class action) against the credit 
card company?” 
In light of the terms reprinted above, the correct answer to 
Question 13 is “no.”  Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 12, four times 
as many respondents chose “yes” as “no.”186  Only one out of eight 
respondents understood that they could not participate in a class action 
if they signed a contract with such a clause.187 
                                                          
 186.  Respondents to the CFPB survey were slightly more likely (56.7%) than our re-
spondents to think they could participate in a class action, despite having entered into a credit 
card contract barring them from doing so.  See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 
120, § 3 at 4.  Again, the slight difference may be attributable to our respondents having been 
presented with the contract shortly before being asked about class actions. 
 187.  We also asked respondents about the effect of a class waiver in a “properly-worded” 
arbitration agreement.  The responses are discussed below in Part V.C.2. 
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FIGURE 12 
 
C.  Consumer Understanding of a Hypothetical “Properly-
Worded” Arbitration Agreement 
In an effort to test not only respondents’ understanding of the 
sample contract, but also whether respondents thought courts would 
enforce a generic arbitration clause, and to obtain views from those who 
might not have read the arbitration clause, the survey asked consumers 
three questions about an arbitration clause described as “properly-
worded.”  The three questions dealt with whether a court would enforce 
an arbitration clause, the effect of a class action waiver, and the finality 
of an arbitral award. 
1.  Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses in General 
After we received reports that some consumers believed clauses 
taking away their right to sue in court would be unenforceable,188 we 
decided to ask Question 19: 
Suppose you agreed to a credit card contract that included a 
properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company 
had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes 
could be resolved only in arbitration.  You think the credit 
card company has overcharged you by $5,000, but the 
company disagrees.  How likely do you think it is that a court 
would throw out the arbitration clause and decide your 
dispute? 
                                                          
 188.  In particular, David Arkush had suggested a question along the lines we posed. 
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FIGURE 13 
 
The Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence forecloses most 
attacks on properly worded arbitration agreements, including attacks 
based on state law doctrines such as unconscionability.189  Because the 
question posited a “properly-worded” arbitration clause, a court should 
not invalidate the clause absent evidence of fraud in the inducement of 
the arbitration agreement itself.  Accordingly, the best answer among 
the choices offered was “very unlikely.”  In fact, about one in six 
respondents chose this answer, as seen in Figure 13.  Collectively, 43% 
of the respondents selected “very unlikely” or “unlikely,” as compared 
with 32% who opted for “very likely” or “likely,” making this one of 
only two questions that more respondents answered correctly than 
incorrectly.  But when the respondents choosing “I don’t know” are 
added to those with wrong answers, a sizable 57% majority of 
respondents failed to recognize that a properly written arbitration clause 
is enforceable.190 
                                                          
 189.  See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987) (noting that a court may not 
“rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that 
enforcement would be unconscionable”). 
 190.  Cf. supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text. 
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2.  Enforcement of Class Action Waivers 
Question 23 asked about class actions, not in connection with the 
supplied contract, but with a “properly-worded” contract clause.  The 
question read: 
 Again, suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that 
included a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the 
company had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but 
that disputes could be resolved only in arbitration.  You think 
the credit card company has overcharged you.  Many other 
consumers have a similar dispute against the credit card 
company.  The company says it has not overcharged anyone.  
Suppose the contract said you could not join with other 
consumers to bring a class action.  Could you be included in 
a class action against the credit card company, either in court 
or arbitration or both? 
Though 8% more respondents incorrectly thought they could 
participate in a class action than correctly thought they could not, as 
demonstrated in Figure 14, that difference is just within the survey’s 
margin of error.  But the total of those clicking “I don’t know” or “yes” 
add up to 71%, or more than twice as many as the 29% who correctly 
answered “no.” 
FIGURE 14 
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Q23: Could you be included in a class action against 
the credit card company, either in court or 
arbitration or both? (N = 665)
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Putting the responses to this question together with the responses 
to Question 13, which asked about the class action waiver in the sample 
contract, demonstrates respondents’ confusion about the effect of class 
action waivers.  Only forty-one respondents, or 6%, correctly responded 
negatively to both questions.  That is, only 6% of respondents 
understood both that the sample agreement precluded their participation 
in a class and that a class waiver in a generic arbitration agreement 
would be enforced.  In contrast, 172, or more than a quarter, wrongly 
responded affirmatively to both questions. 
Some of the written comments on those two questions shed 
additional light on respondents’ thinking: 
 I don’t see how they could preclude us from filing a 
class action suit through a whimsy little contract. 
 I believe that would be my rights as a citizen. 
 JUST BECAUSE THE CONTRACT SAYS IT 
DON’T MEAN A JUDGE CAN’T OVERRULE IT 
ESPECIALLY A CIRCUIT COURT PANEL—
BUT WHO WANTS TO GO THROUGH ALL 
THAT!!! 
 Based on my memory of what I think I’ve read has 
happened.  And an old cliche, “You can’t sign away 
your rights.” 
 [N]o way they can tell me that they can screw up and 
then I have no recourse. 
In sum, many of the respondents seemed not to realize that they 
could sign away their rights to join a class, and nearly 90% did not 
appreciate that this contract did just that,191 despite the repeated notice 
and the bolding, italics, and ALLCAPS of the class action waiver. 
3.  The Finality of Arbitral Awards 
Arbitral awards are normally final and binding.  The Supreme 
Court has held that the grounds listed in the FAA for vacating an arbitral 
award are exclusive.192  Those grounds are extremely limited.  They do 
not, for example, permit a court to vacate an award on the grounds that 
the arbitrator made a legal error. 
To test whether consumers understand that an arbitral award 
cannot be challenged on substantive grounds in a court of law, Question 
21 described the following scenario: 
                                                          
 191.   Cf. supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text. 
 192.  See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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 Suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that 
included a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the 
company had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but 
that disputes could be resolved only in arbitration and the 
arbitrator’s decision is final.  Just as in the last question, you 
think the credit card company has overcharged you by 
$5,000, but the company disagrees. Assume also you brought 
an arbitration proceeding against the company and the 
arbitrator decided against you and ruled you had to pay the 
$5,000.  Assume that the arbitrator had unintentionally made 
a mistake about the law and so ruled against you, but that 
otherwise the arbitrator had conducted the arbitration 
properly. 
 Which of the following options would be available to you? 
The correct answer among the available choices was “Nothing. I 
would still have to pay the money.”  More than three times as many 
respondents chose an incorrect answer as chose the correct answer.  
Nearly half of the respondents thought that they could appeal from the 
arbitrator’s decision to one or more arbitrators,193 and overall a majority 
of the respondents clung to their view that the arbitrator’s decision 
would not be final even though the question told them that the contract 
said it was final.  Less than a fifth realized that the decision would in 
fact be final.  Figure 15 shows the distribution of answers. 
 
                                                          
 193.  Some arbitration clauses do in fact provide for an appeal to a panel of arbitrators.  
See, e.g., YOUR GIANT EAGLE CREDIT CARD ACCOUNT AGREEMENT § I.C.11, 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/a/assets/credit-card-agreements/pdf/creditcardagree-
ment_10261.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2015) (“[A]ny party can, within 30 days after the entry 
of the award by the arbitrator, appeal the award to a three-arbitrator panel . . . .”).  The con-
tract provided to respondents at the outset of the survey did not include such a right of appeal.  
Indeed, it stated in boldface: “The arbitrator’s decision will generally be final and binding, 
except for the limited right of appeal provided by the Federal Arbitration Act.”  Accordingly, 
consumers should not have been confused by the sample contract.  In any event, the sample 
contract was not relevant to the question. 
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FIGURE 15 
 
 
The comments confirm that many respondents did not appreciate 
that an arbitrator’s decision can be final.  For example, respondents who 
clicked that consumers could appeal to an arbitrator or arbitrators 
wrote:194 
 [S]eems only fair that you could appeal. 
 I will fight for my right. 
 If that did not work I would take them to court. 
 I would have it overlooked by another arbitrator or 
appeal to a higher court. 
 Its [sic] my right. 
 [B]ecause the arbitrator unintentionally made a 
mistake, I feel that my rights were not handle [sic] in 
the best way possible for me to retreive [sic] my 
money, therefore the contract could not be binding, I 
feel like I was misrepresented and if I can show proof 
that a mistake was made the I deserve a retrial. 
                                                          
 194.  That answer read “I could appeal to another arbitrator or arbitrators.” 
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Q21: Which of the following options would be available to 
you regarding the court ruling against you? (N = 668)
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Other research has found that consumers sometimes disregard 
disclosed information that contradicts their preconceptions.195 This may 
be another example of this phenomenon. Additional studies are needed 
to determine more conclusively whether consumers are able to 
comprehend the fact that an arbitrator’s decision, based on an error, 
cannot be appealed if a contract so provides.  The responses certainly 
raise questions about whether this is the case. 
4.  Consumer Awareness of Arbitration Agreements in Their 
Own Contracts 
We attempted to assess consumers’ awareness of arbitration 
agreements in their own commercial interactions by first asking 
respondents, in Question 25, whether they have entered into “a 
consumer contract with any company that said you have to arbitrate any 
disputes and can’t sue the company” and then asking respondents if they 
had an account with several businesses whose consumer contracts 
include arbitration clauses.  Specifically, Question 27 asked if 
respondents had accounts with PayPal,196 Skype,197 or a cell phone 
account with Verizon Wireless,198 AT&T Mobility,199 or Sprint200 on 
which the respondent is the primary person on the account and signed 
the contract.201  Each of those contracts includes an arbitration clause. 
                                                          
 195.  MACRO INT’L INC., CONSUMER TESTING OF MORTGAGE BROKER DISCLOSURES: 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 12–26 (2008), http://www.federalre-
serve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20080714regzconstest.pdf; cf. Stark et al., supra note 
181, at 843 (reporting on results of study stated, “most consumers, even if they carefully read 
the limitation-of-remedies clause in the contracts presented to them, will not understand what 
rights they have waived”). 
 196.  The arbitration clause appears in Section 14.3.  PayPal User Agreement, PAYPAL 
(May 1, 2015), https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/ua/useragreement-full. 
 197.  The arbitration clause appears in Paragraph 15.  Microsoft Services Agreement, 
MICROSOFT (June 4, 2015), http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/servicesagreement/. 
 198.  The arbitration clause can be found on page 2.  VERIZON WIRELESS, YOUR 
VERIZON WIRELESS CUSTOMER AGREEMENT, http://www.verizonwireless.com/settle-
ment/National_CA.pdf. 
 199.  The arbitration clause can be found in Section 2.0. Wireless Customer Agreement, 
AT&T, http://www.att.com/shop/en/legalterms.html?toskey=wirelessCustomerAgree-
ment#disputeResolutionByBindingArb (last visited Aug. 3, 2015). 
 200.  The arbitration clause appears on page 8.  SPRINT, STANDARD TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS FOR COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES (2014), http://www.sprint.com/business/re-
sources/ratesandterms/Standard_Terms_and_Conditions_for_Communications_Ser-
vices.pdf. 
 201.  Because many people are part of a family plan under which one person—perhaps a 
parent or spouse—signs the cell phone contract on behalf of other members of the family, it 
is possible to have a cell phone without having had an opportunity to see or agree to the 
contract.  Hence the question’s wording. 
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Six hundred forty-eight respondents answered both of those 
questions, as shown in Figure 16.202  Of those, 303 respondents said 
they had never entered into a consumer contract with an arbitration 
clause.  And of those, 264, or 87%, did indeed have at least one account 
subject to an arbitration clause, meaning that they did not realize they 
had agreed to an arbitration clause.203  In total, a minimum of 40% of 
respondents answering both questions mistakenly believed they had not 
agreed to an arbitration clause when they had in fact agreed to at least 
                                                          
 202.  Question 27 asked respondents if they had an account with one of several companies 
that include arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts.  During phase one, Question 27 
did not offer as an option “none of the above.”  Instead, the survey asked respondents to click 
on any of the accounts they had, and if they did not click on any, that indicated they had none 
of the listed accounts.  During phase two, Qualtrics set up that question (along with the other 
multiple choice questions) to compel a response.  One person clicked one of the items in 
Question 27 but wrote in the comments that he (or she) did not actually have such an account 
but was required to click on an item to advance in the survey.  At that point, for the remaining 
respondents, we added the “none of the above” option.  We also went back to the Qualtrics 
panelists who had already answered that question and excluded the answers for those who 
had clicked only one account in answering Question 27 on the theory that they might not 
actually have had an account with that company (we did not do that for people who had 
clicked two or more items because they were not compelled to click two items and so must 
have believed they had two such accounts).  As a result, we collected only 649 responses to 
Question 27.  Six hundred forty-eight also answered Question 25. 
 203.  Of those, 105 had two such accounts, and thirty-three had three.  The PayPal con-
tract permits consumers to opt out of arbitration if, within thirty days of accepting the PayPal 
agreement for the first time, they mail a written statement to PayPal containing certain in-
formation specified in the PayPal agreement.  Consequently, it is theoretically possible that 
one or more of the respondents who stated that they had not agreed to an arbitration clause 
and had entered into a contract with PayPal had opted out of arbitration.  However, for sev-
eral reasons, it is likely that no respondent had opted out, and we view the possibility that 
more than one respondent opted out as remote.  First, no respondents indicated that they had 
opted out of arbitration in response to our invitation to comment on the PayPal question.  
Second, available information suggests that only about one consumer in a thousand opts out 
of arbitration clauses by the deadline.  In Ross v. Bank of America, discussed supra note 58, 
the Discover defendants submitted proposed findings of fact, which stated, “[s]ince Discover 
added its opt-out clause, at least 6,500 cardholders have successfully opted out of the arbi-
tration provision.”  Discover Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Face and Conclusions of 
Law ¶ 78, Ross v. Bank of Am., 524 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2008), (No. 05-cv-07116),  
https://www.arbitration.ccfsettlement.com/documents/files/Dis-
cover%20FOF%20and%20COL.PDF.  Plaintiffs also submitted proposed findings of fact,  
which stated, “6,500 [or] some 0.1% of Discover Cardholders” had opted out.  Plaintiffs’ 
Proposed Findings of Fact ¶ 659, Ross v. Bank of Am., 524 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2008), (No. 
05-cv-07116)  https://www.arbitration.ccfsettlement.com/documents/files/FoF-CoL.PDF.  
Finally, for the reasons discussed infra in Part VI.B.3, it seems consumer opt-outs are rare.  
In any event, if we exclude from our results the ninety-three respondents who indicated that 
that had agreed to a PayPal account but no other account carrying an arbitration clause, we 
still end up with 171 consumers, or 56% of the respondents who stated that they had not 
agreed to a contract with an arbitration clause but had actually entered into a contract with 
such a clause. 
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one arbitration clause.204  Furthermore, another 244 respondents, or 
38% of the total who answered both questions, did not know whether 
they had entered into an arbitration agreement or not.  In fact, 218 of 
those respondents—89%—had entered into at least one arbitration 
agreement.205 
  
                                                          
 204. In all likelihood, the percentage is even higher.  The 13% who said they had not 
entered into a consumer arbitration contract, and did not have a contract with one of the 
companies we asked about, may have agreed to other contracts (credit card, checking ac-
count, etc.) that included an arbitration clause. 
 205.  We did not ask respondents when they entered into contracts with the various com-
panies we asked about.  Conceivably, some respondents entered into such contracts before 
those businesses adopted arbitration clauses and the businesses later amended their contracts 
to provide for arbitration of disputes, notifying consumers through bill-stuffers or in some 
other way.  An issue that might be fruitfully explored in later research would be whether 
consumers are more aware of arbitration clauses if they appear in the original contract than 
if they are added by later amendment. 
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Some of the respondents’ comments on these questions make it 
even clearer that they did not realize that they had signed such contracts.  
One respondent wrote “i wo uld [sic] never never up my right to [sue 
the company].”  The respondent had agreed to two of the listed 
contracts.  Another commenter explained, “i [sic] am a person to read 
about this before signing anything, i [sic] have never seen or read 
anything like this i [sic] seen mostly read [sic], very surprising . . . .”  
That respondent also had agreed to a contract with an arbitration clause.  
One respondent who had denied entering into a contract with an 
arbitration clause added “please tell me i [sic] haven’t entered into such 
a contract.”  The respondent had. 
The survey also asked respondents, “[b]efore entering into a 
contract, do you look to see if the contract says you have to arbitrate 
any disputes and can’t sue the company?”  Of the 176 respondents who 
said they did look for an arbitration clause, ninety-eight also said they 
had never entered into a contract with an arbitration clause.  Of those, 
eighty-three, or 85%, had in fact agreed to at least one contract 
including an arbitration clause.206  Of those who said they did not look 
to see if contracts contain an arbitration clause but also denied having 
entered into a contract with such a clause, 87% had actually agreed to 
an arbitration clause.207  In other words, people who think they have not 
agreed to arbitration and claim to check contracts for arbitration 
clauses are about as likely to have actually agreed to at least one 
arbitration clause as those who think they have not agreed to arbitration 
and do not check contracts for arbitration clauses. 
VI.  DISCUSSION 
Our research suggests that typical consumers do not realize when 
they have agreed to arbitrate and do not understand the consequences 
of agreeing to arbitrate.  While that finding may be unsurprising on its 
face, the depth of consumer misunderstanding did surprise us.  Even 
those respondents who claimed to read and understand the contract got 
the most basic questions about the nature and effect of the arbitration 
clause wrong.  A large majority of the respondents who realized that the 
sample contract included an arbitration clause still did not appreciate 
                                                          
 206.  Again, we do not know whether the remaining 15% had not agreed to a contract 
with an arbitration clause—only that they had not entered into a contract with any of the 
entities listed in the survey. 
 207.  Of the 301 people who said they did not look to see if contracts include arbitration 
clauses, 122 claimed never to have entered into a contract with an arbitration clause, and 106 
of those had done so.  Of course, if they did not look for arbitration clauses, it is hard to know 
the basis for their claim that they had never entered into a contract with an arbitration clause. 
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what arbitration entails, evoking Nobel-prize-winning physicist 
Richard Feynman’s observation that knowing the name of something is 
not the same as knowing it.208  It is not an exaggeration to say that 
consumers have no idea what they are agreeing to when they enter into 
contracts containing arbitration clauses.  Beyond that basic level of 
misunderstanding, we believe our results also indicate an expectation 
on the part of many consumers that court will be available to them, if 
only as a last resort. 
We believe that this persistent misunderstanding, coupled with the 
reasonable expectations for adjudicative process that our respondents 
demonstrated, suggest a need for Congress, the courts, and agencies to 
re-examine mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in the consumer context.  
In the remainder of this Section, we explain our reasons in more detail 
and then raise and respond to several possible arguments for why our 
findings should not provoke such a re-examination. 
A.  Implications for the Regulation of Consumer Arbitration 
1.  Deep Consumer Misunderstanding of Arbitration and its 
Effects 
To put the survey results in terms familiar to academics, our 
respondents would have failed miserably had this been a test of their 
understanding of arbitration.  We asked eight questions that had clear 
right and wrong answers.  Not one of those eight questions elicited a 
majority of correct responses.  Only two questions garnered more 
correct answers than incorrect answers.  On four questions, in contrast, 
more respondents gave incorrect answers than correct answers, in some 
cases by margins of three–or even four-to-one.  In other words, the 
responses suggest that a majority of respondents did not realize what 
rights they give up when they agree to arbitration, and many of the 
respondents who did think they understood were more likely to be 
wrong than right.209 
                                                          
 208.  RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, “WHAT DO YOU CARE WHAT OTHER PEOPLE THINK?”: 
FURTHER ADVENTURES OF A CURIOUS CHARACTER 14 (1988) (“I learned very early the 
difference between knowing the name of something and knowing something.”). 
 209.  Available anecdotal evidence offers some confirmation of these findings.  See F. 
Paul Bland, Jr., Executive Director, Public Justice, Comments of Public Justice to the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau on the Proposed New Information Collection, “Tele-
phone Survey Exploring Consumer Awareness of and Perceptions Regarding Dispute Reso-
lution Provisions in Credit Card Agreements,” (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2014-0011-0012 (“Our experience 
of speaking with a large number of consumers supports the proposition that only a tiny frac-
tion read these fine print provisions [arbitration clauses] stripping them of their rights, and 
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The survey illustrated this lack of understanding of arbitration 
clauses in other ways.  Of the more than 5000 answers that respondents 
provided to the eight questions with right and wrong answers, only a 
quarter were correct, as shown in Figure 18b.  Only two people—less 
than 1%—got all eight questions right, out of the 663 who responded to 
all eight questions.  In contrast, 117 respondents, or 18%, did not get a 
single correct answer—more than got at least half the questions right.  
If this had been a test with a passing grade of sixty-five, as was common 
when we were high school students, 96% of the respondents would have 
failed.  Only twenty-three respondents, or less than 4%, would have 
passed.210 
If the number of correct answers (or lack thereof) provides a rough 
indication of the number of respondents who understood what the 
arbitration clause entailed, the level of outright misconceptions is 
indicated by the number of incorrect answers, as displayed in Figure 
18b.211  More than half the respondents got at least three answers wrong, 
demonstrating that numerous respondents suffer from multiple 
mistaken beliefs about arbitration clauses.  Overall, respondents gave 
44% more wrong answers than right answers, as shown in Figure 
18b.212 
Even respondents who believed they understood the contract fared 
poorly.  Question 3 of the survey asked respondents, “[h]ow much of 
the contract did you read and understand?”  Figures 18a and 19a show 
the responses.  Using regression analysis, we found that those who 
reported reading and understanding more of the contract had a higher 
percentage of correct answers, and that the difference was significant at 
                                                          
even fewer accurately comprehend these provisions.”).  At least one industry organization 
has also concluded that consumers do not read credit card contracts.  See American Financial 
Services Association, Comment Letter on Telephone Survey Exploring Consumer Aware-
ness of and Perceptions Regarding Dispute Resolution Provisions in Credit Card Agreements 
(Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.afsaonline.org/library/files/legal/comment_letters/CFPBArbi-
trationSurvey.pdf (“The results of the [proposed CFPB] Survey will undoubtedly show that 
the vast majority of consumers are not aware of most of the provisions in their card agree-
ments . . . .  [S]tudies have shown that consumers do not generally read contracts.  Accord-
ingly, if consumers do not read contracts generally, there is no reason to assume that they 
may read an arbitration provision, in particular . . . .  [T]he [proposed CFPB telephone] Sur-
vey is likely to show that consumers are not generally aware of the arbitration provision in 
their credit card agreement . . . .”). 
 210.  The instructions told respondents: “This is not a test.”  Perhaps it was a good thing 
that it was not. 
 211.  The numbers of respondents with correct and incorrect responses do not mirror each 
other because the answer “I don’t know” is scored neither as correct nor incorrect. 
 212.  Figure 16 shows that we recorded 1352 correct answers and 1950 incorrect answers, 
or 598 more incorrect answers than correct ones, representing 44% more incorrect answers. 
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the .05 level.213  Figures 19a and b show the percentage of correct 
answers compared with how much the respondent claimed to have read 
and understood.  But respondents who reported reading and 
understanding the entire contract still averaged correct responses to 
only 28% of the questions, while those who described themselves as 
reading and understanding most of the contract clicked the right answer 
to only 30% of the questions.  This may be especially troubling because 
consumers who believe they understand a contract may place greater 
trust in that supposed understanding when making decisions—and yet 
the percentage of correct answers indicates that the respondents who 
claimed greater comprehension were only slightly less confused than 
the average respondent, and still were a long way from mastery of the 
meaning of the arbitration clause. 
                                                          
 213.  Regression analysis found several other significant predictors at the .05 level, and 
the t-test indicates that higher total annual household income correlates with a higher per-
centage of correct answers, as did spending more time on page six of the contract (the page 
which included the key provisions of the arbitration clause), and more time on the first six 
pages of the contract.  In addition, the twelve respondents who identified themselves as law-
yers or law students averaged correct answers 54% of the time, as compared with the re-
maining respondents, who averaged correct answers 25% of the time, as shown in Figure 17.  
The factors that were not significant predictors of correct answers included the amount of 
time spent reading the contract; highest level of education attained; whether the respondent 
had ever been involved in an arbitration; and whether the respondent had worked for a bank, 
credit union, savings and loan, or cell phone company within the previous five years. 
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FIGURE 17 
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FIGURE 18A 
 
FIGURE 18B 
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FIGURE 19A  
 
FIGURE 19B 
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Furthermore, those who reported reading and understanding more 
of the contract were much more likely to answer the eight questions 
incorrectly than those who professed less understanding, as shown in 
Figure 19.214  For example, those who said they read and understood all 
of the contract were more than twice as likely to record wrong answers 
as those who reported reading and understanding very little of the 
contract.  Those who claimed greater understanding were emboldened 
to attempt to answer more questions, rather than to select “I don’t 
know,” but their confidence in their understanding was misplaced.  
Indeed, respondents saying they read and understood the entire contract 
gave twice as many wrong answers as right ones. 
Finally, our respondents demonstrated a lack of understanding 
about arbitration agreements in their real-world consumer contracts.  
Although the overwhelming majority of our respondents had entered 
into at least one consumer contract with an arbitration agreement, less 
than 16% realized they had done so.215  Our results thus suggest that 
consumers are routinely signing away constitutional rights without 
knowing it. 
In short, the survey raises serious questions about whether the 
consent consumers provide to arbitration is informed in any meaningful 
sense of the word, and therefore whether they consent at all.216  As a 
practical matter, if consumers are not aware of arbitration clauses, do 
not interpret them correctly, think they will not be enforced, or some 
combination of all three, businesses are free to draft those terms in 
whatever ways serve their own interests, at the consumer’s expense.217 
                                                          
 214.  For purposes of this statement, as with all statements about right and wrong an-
swers, an answer of “I don’t know” is scored as neither correct nor incorrect. 
 215.  Consumer awareness of arbitration clauses in their contracts did not vary according 
to which contract we asked about—cell phone, PayPal, or Skype.  Put another way, the dif-
ferences in respondents’ answers to the questions about whether they had agreed to an arbi-
tration clause were not statistically significant regardless of which one of those contracts 
they had entered into.  The fact that the different contracts were equally ineffective in causing 
consumers to realize that they had entered into agreements to arbitrate further suggests that 
the form of disclosure does not affect consumer understanding of arbitration clauses. 
 216.  Cf. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 183, at 45 (“The Commission concludes that 
consumers should, but generally do not, have a meaningful choice regarding mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration provisions in consumer credit contracts.  To give consumers such choice, 
they must have: (1) a basic understanding of arbitration and its consequences . . . .”). 
 217.  See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme 
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 688–89 (1996) (“If the 
consumer is not aware of the existence or significance of [a] clause, the supplier is free to 
impose a term that benefits the supplier but significantly harms the consumer.”). 
SovernFinalBookProof 10/4/2015  12:06 AM 
70 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:1 
2.  Consumer Expectations Regarding Access to Court 
Our research suggests that many people view participation in a 
public adjudicative process as an option that cannot be divested through 
contractual boilerplate.  Almost half of our respondents thought the 
sample agreement would allow them to pursue in court a claim too large 
for small claims court, and only 14% recognized that the contract 
banned litigation of larger claims in court.218  Less than 20% of 
respondents recognized that the contract would prevent them from 
defending before a jury a claim too large for small claims court.  Even 
when told in the question that a properly-worded arbitration clause 
applied, almost one third of our respondents thought it likely or very 
likely that a court would ignore the arbitration agreement and decide a 
dispute with $5000 at stake.219 
The comments show that many survey participants believed that 
access to court is such a fundamental right that a judge would not 
enforce a consumer contract denying the right to pursue adjudication.  
For example, in response to Question 7, asking respondents whether 
they could pursue a claim for overpayments in court, we received the 
following comments: 
    You always have a right to pursue legal action when 
someone has wronged you, it is not up to one party 
or another to determine whether or not they will take 
away that right. 
  It depends on the amount involved and the level of 
fairness in the charge.  If the amount overcharged is 
high enough to be considered predatory, I would 
definitely consider suing. 
    I imagine that this would fall under interstate 
commerce laws as well and the user/cardholder 
would apple [sic] to take this to court. 
  I believe it is your American right to sue in larger 
court systems. 
     Doesn’t matter to them what the contract says, why 
should it matter to me?  You get enough money on 
the table and I’ll always be able to find a lawyer 
willing to sue.  If he’s any good he’ll get to court no 
matter what the contract says. 
Similarly, in response to Question 9, which asked about survey 
participants’ right to a jury trial on a claim brought against them by the 
credit card company, we received the following comments: 
                                                          
 218.  See supra notes 175 & 181 and accompanying text. 
 219.  See supra Part V.C.1. 
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 A jury trial.  Hmmm.  Maybe in the contract they 
specified I waive my right to a jury?  But I’m not sure 
if legally they can put that in a contract.  I feel like 
that may be pre-empted by law.  But I’m speculated 
[sic] and not a lawyer.  I don’t know the answer. 
 Binding arbitrators are stipulated, right?  I GUESS 
that stipulation could be contested, THEN we’d get a 
jury trial.  It’s also why I avoid putting very much on 
credit cards. 
 I did not read that section.  I would assume I would 
be able to have a jury trial or go to arbitration. 
 Disputes are better settled in court. 
 I would again expect that I would have the same 
rights of all other citizens of the United States and 
that as a corporation the credit card company would 
have the ‘right of compensation’ for charges not able 
to prove were fall. [sic] 
 You have wright [sic] to fight for money. 
 Yes the dispute can be settled in court with all rights 
reserved.  If the company was notified [t]he Fair 
Credit Billings Act required the company to 
acknowledge in 30 day and resolve the dispute in 
approx. 90 days.  From there they violated laws 
explained in the Federal Trade Comission [sic] 
website. 
To be sure, we cannot say why all or even most of our respondents 
gave the answers they did because so many did not give explanatory 
comments.  Respondents who gave answers indicating that they thought 
they would have access to court may have been relying on a default 
assumption that they do not find particularly meaningful.  That is, even 
if they expect to go to court, they may not prefer to go to court.  
Focusing as we were on consumer understanding, we did not ask 
respondents whether they prefer litigation to arbitration.  We did not 
study consumers’ perceptions of any actual arbitration process.  Our 
survey was not designed to shed light on whether consumers who 
assume they will have access to court would embrace arbitration once 
a real dispute arose. 
Nevertheless, we find it significant that many consumers seem to 
expect to have access to court, even if they have agreed to arbitrate.  
Given the deep roots of the civil jury trial in American constitutional 
history, public expectations about access to judicial process deserve 
respect and protection.  The Federal Constitution and the constitutions 
of all fifty states guarantee a right to a jury trial in civil cases.  The 
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Second Continental Congress specifically noted deprivation of the right 
to a jury trial in the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking 
Up Arms.220  Thomas Jefferson also mentioned it in the Declaration of 
Independence.221  The failure to include a right to a civil jury in the 
Constitution gave Anti-Federalists some of their best ammunition in the 
ratification debates, as Alexander Hamilton acknowledged in The 
Federalist No. 83.222  The backlash ultimately resulted in the inclusion 
of the Seventh Amendment in the Bill of Rights.  Notably, the cases 
that most concerned the Anti-Federalists were debt collection cases—
precisely the kind of claim a credit card company is most likely to 
pursue against a customer.223 
Coupled with those constitutional guarantees of a jury right, we 
believe our findings regarding consumer expectations of judicial 
process shift the burden onto those who argue that no regulation of 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts is 
justified.  We note that a variety of legislative and regulatory responses 
have been considered and some already enacted.  Congress has enacted 
several laws barring the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in 
particular consumer contracts—outlawing pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in mortgages and other loans secured by a consumer’s principal 
dwelling224—and in certain obligations incurred by soldiers and their 
families.225  In the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, Congress authorized the 
CFPB to bar or limit the use of arbitration clauses in consumer financial 
contracts if the CFPB found such regulation “in the public interest and 
for the protection of consumers” and “consistent  with the study” of 
                                                          
 220.  DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF TAKING UP ARMS (July 6, 
1775). 
 221.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776). 
 222.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[The] objection to the plan of 
the convention, which has met with most success in this State, and perhaps in several of the 
other States, is THAT RELATIVE TO THE WANT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISION for the trial by jury in civil cases.”). 
 223.  See Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh Amendment, 87 
IOWA L. REV. 145, 18889 (2001). 
 224.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e) (2012) (prohibiting arbitration clauses in residential mort-
gage loans and open end credit loans secured by the consumer’s principal dwelling, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1026.36(h) (2014) and implementing § 1639(e) by prohibiting mandatory arbitration 
clauses in consumer credit transactions secured by a dwelling “including a home equity line 
of credit secured by the consumer’s principal dwelling”).  The ban does not apply to mort-
gages issued before June 1, 2013, though.  Many mortgages issued earlier lack arbitration 
clauses because the two mammoth government-sponsored enterprises that buy mortgages in 
the secondary market previously refused to purchase mortgages containing arbitration 
clauses. 
 225.  See 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3) (2012) (as implemented by 32 C.F.R. § 232.8(a)(3) 
(2010)). 
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arbitration the Dodd-Frank Act directed the CFPB to conduct.226  The 
CFPB completed that study on March 10, 2015.227  Finally, various 
members of Congress have sponsored the proposed Arbitration Fairness 
Act, which would invalidate pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer 
and employment contracts.228  We believe both legislators and 
regulators, as well as courts, should consider consumer understanding 
of arbitration agreements as an important factor in the decision whether 
to further limit or ban consumer arbitration agreements.  In the 
following Section, we respond to several arguments that arbitration 
proponents may make in urging lawmakers not to rely on results in this 
study to regulate or ban consumer arbitration agreements.229 
                                                          
 226.  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 
5518(b) (2012)). 
 227.  See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 120. 
 228.  Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 229.  Some have complained that we did not attempt to determine the extent of consumer 
understanding of other contract provisions.  See Alan Kaplinsky, Mark Levin & Daniel 
McKenna, Consumers Fare Better with Arbitration, AM. BANKER (Dec. 23, 2014), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/consumers-fare-better-with-arbitration-
1071776-1.html?utm_me-
dium=email&ET=americanbanker%3Ae97637%3Aa%3A&utm_campaign=-
dec%2023%202014&utm_source=newsletter&st=email%20.  The implication is that if con-
sumers comprehend other clauses no better than arbitration clauses, consumer misunder-
standing of arbitration clauses is somehow less significant.  This argument has several flaws.  
First, some evidence suggests that arbitration clauses are, in fact, more difficult to understand 
than other clauses.  As noted above, the CFPB’s testing found that reading a credit card 
arbitration clause required, on average, about three years more education than the rest of the 
contract.  See supra notes 132 & 134.  Second, when regulators adopted the current version 
of the Schumer Box (incorporated in our sample credit card contract), they verified that con-
sumers could understand it.  See Fed. Reserve Sys., Truth in Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 5244 
(Jan. 29, 2009); MACRO INT’L INC., DESIGN AND TESTING OF EFFECTIVE TRUTH IN 
LENDING DISCLOSURES: FINDINGS FROM EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 1925 (2008), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20081218a8.pdf (posing vari-
ous questions about consumer understanding of terms; averaging the reported scores indi-
cates that consumers correctly answered the questions asked 51% of the time).  In addition 
other studies have suggested greater consumer understanding of some contract clauses than 
we found.  See, e.g., Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and 
Contract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on 
Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 88–89 (1997) (finding that 65% of 
respondents identified exculpatory clause in auto-repair contract and 66% identified excul-
patory clause in health-club contract).  But even assuming that consumer grasp of other 
clauses is comparable to their confusion about arbitration clauses, and that the lack of under-
standing of other contract clauses should have no bearing on whether consumers are bound 
by them, arbitration clauses are still distinguishable from other clauses.  That is because 
consumers agreeing to arbitration clauses waive constitutional rights, like the right to a jury 
trial or a day in court, and such rights should not be surrendered unknowingly.  See supra 
notes 209–212 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Responses to Possible Objections 
We see three main objections to greater oversight or the outright 
banning of consumer arbitration.  First, some may argue that regulation 
is unnecessary because market forces will ensure fairness for 
consumers.  Second, arbitration proponents may argue that arbitration 
offers a superior option for consumers, and so it should be left 
unregulated.  Finally, some may argue that increased disclosure or opt-
outs are sufficient to address any problems with consumer 
understanding. 
1.  Market Forces as a Guarantor of Fairness for Consumers 
In an influential law review article, Alan Schwartz and Louis L. 
Wilde argued that companies would not take undue advantage of 
consumers in drafting contract terms as long as enough consumers 
whose business the companies want would refuse to enter into contracts 
containing those terms.230  If businesses cannot distinguish between 
consumers who care about the term and consumers who do not, the 
theory goes, the businesses will draft their contracts to avoid alienating 
the consumers who care about the terms, and all consumers, whether or 
not they care about the term, will reap the benefits.231  Applied to 
consumer arbitration, Schwartz and Wilde’s theory predicts that market 
forces will ensure that consumers are not harmed by the dispute 
resolution processes dictated by the companies they contract with.  
Consequently, under this theory, regulation of consumer arbitration is 
unnecessary. 
Whatever merit this theory may have in other contexts,232 its 
validity in the arbitration context is questionable at best.  The evidence 
from our research suggests that consumer awareness of arbitration is 
too low to incentivize companies to take consumer preferences into 
account in drafting dispute resolution clauses.  As discussed above, 
when we asked respondents to recall five terms from the credit card 
contract, only twenty-three, or about 3%, of the respondents mentioned 
the arbitration clause.233  Arbitration tied for fourteenth on the list of 
items recalled by the respondents.  Even assuming that all twenty-three 
of those respondents would spurn contracts including arbitration 
                                                          
 230.  See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Im-
perfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979). 
 231.  See id. 
 232.  For a compilation of criticisms of Schwartz & Wilde’s theory, see Jeff Sovern, To-
ward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 166782 (2006). 
 233.  See supra notes 170–171 and accompanying text. 
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clauses, it is hard to believe that merchants would resist using 
arbitration clauses to attract the business of only 3% of the population 
at large, or, for that matter, a number three times as large.234 
Adherents of the Schwartz and Wilde thesis might respond that the 
fact that consumers do not notice arbitration clauses or, by 
extrapolation, make purchasing decisions based on their inclusion, 
indicates that arbitration is working tolerably well for consumers.  If the 
arbitration practices of a company were causing serious consumer 
harm, in theory, consumers would learn about it and punish the 
company by taking their business elsewhere.  The problem is that 
arbitration, by its very nature, inhibits the dissemination of information 
about the arbitration process.  One of the key features of arbitration is 
that it is confidential.  The process is not open to the public and the 
results are not published.  Consumers thus often have no way of 
learning whether a company’s dispute resolution policy is favorable to 
consumers or not, so the market will not function efficiently to regulate 
those policies.235  Nor do businesses shunning arbitration clauses have 
much incentive to educate consumers about the value of court litigation.  
Such an effort would require the business to acknowledge that its 
dissatisfied consumers might sue—hardly a selling point. 
Class waivers compound the problem.  Class actions are an 
important means of publicizing information about corporate 
wrongdoing.  They generate media interest, both when they are filed 
and when settlements are announced, and consumers are notified 
through the class action process that their rights have been affected.  
Cutting off class actions is, among other things, a way for companies to 
hide the grievances against them, making it less likely that consumers 
will learn about grievances at all and therefore about the fairness of the 
company-dictated procedures used to resolve them.  Arbitration 
                                                          
 234.  See Sternlight, supra note 217, at 691 (“[With regard to arbitration] it seems likely 
that the ‘knowledgeable minority’ is an extremely small minority. . . .  If the knowledgeable 
minority is sufficiently small, the supplier may well make enough money from taking ad-
vantage of the majority to more than justify losing the minority’s business.”); Michael I. 
Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form 
Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1270–71 (1993). 
Schwartz and Wilde’s assumptions are unrealistic.  Although there may be some markets 
where sellers have generally changed their forms to please the relatively few informed and 
powerful buyers, Schwartz and Wilde offer no evidence to support their conclusion that such 
markets are typical. 
 235.  Cf. Meyerson, supra note 81, at 595 (“[I]nefficient transactions occur because con-
sumers do not read form contracts, or do not understand the terms, and are thus unaware of 
their contents.”). 
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agreements thus inhibit the very market regulation that is supposed to 
protect consumers from unfair arbitration agreements.236 
2.  Arbitration as a Superior Procedural Option for Consumers 
One of the most common arguments that arbitration proponents 
make is that arbitration offers a superior procedural option for 
consumers.  Arbitration proponents take the position that arbitration 
meets or exceeds litigation at providing effective access to justice.  
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Concepcion rests largely on his 
view that Congress, in the FAA, sought to promote arbitration over 
litigation because arbitration offers a superior process.237 
To be sure, litigation can be expensive, time-consuming, and 
frustrating.238  Under the right circumstances, arbitration can offer a 
better process.  But the benefits arbitration offers for commercial actors 
of roughly equal power may not carry over to arbitration between 
business entities and their customers.  Many arbitration skeptics believe 
that arbitrators are influenced by a repeat-player effect, either 
consciously or subconsciously favoring parties and lawyers they 
encounter in repeated proceedings.239  Relatedly, skeptics contend that, 
because businesses select the arbitration service when they write 
contracts, arbitration providers have an incentive to find for businesses 
so that the businesses continue to choose that arbitration service.240  The 
                                                          
 236.  Individual consumers could disclose unfavorable arbitration results, and in some 
cases they have done so.  See, for example, Lost in the Fine Print, ALLIANCE FOR JUST. 
(2014), http://www.afj.org/multimedia/first-monday-films/films/lost-in-the-fine-print.  It is 
more difficult for consumers to demonstrate that their particular case is more than an isolated 
problem.   
 237.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (“The overarch-
ing purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”). 
 238.  See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1786–87 
(2001). 
 239.  Attempts to study the repeat-player effect have produced mixed results.  See Rich-
ard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for 
Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1256–58 (2001).  Alderman states: 
The limited empirical data . . . suggests that arbitration favors the repeat-
player. . . .  Although little hard data is available to support or refute the allegation 
of repeat-player bias in pre-dispute mandatory arbitration, the repeat-player 
clearly comes out ahead by controlling the decision to arbitrate and benefiting 
from the processes surrounding arbitration. Additionally, even though anecdotal, 
the evidence seems to support the conclusion that, consciously or not, arbitrators 
tend to favor the repeat-player whose continued business is essential for their fi-
nancial success. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 240.  See Joshua Frank, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, Stacked Deck: A Statistical 
Analysis of Forced Arbitration (May 31, 2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/credit-
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NAF settlement gives some justification for that concern.  Many banks 
had used NAF, and at least some evidence suggested that they chose 
NAF because it promised speedy decisions in their favor.241 
We will not attempt to resolve the debate over the comparative 
advantages of arbitration and litigation in this Article.  Again, we 
acknowledge the benefits arbitration can provide under the right 
circumstances.  We see no objection to arbitration where the consumer 
is given the option of choosing it after the dispute arises.  At that point, 
consumers are in a better position to make informed choices about the 
available procedural options.  But our research suggests that consumers 
are not able to make informed choices—choices that deprive them of 
important procedural rights—at the pre-dispute contracting stage.  They 
simply do not understand what arbitration entails, even when they 
realize they are agreeing to it.  Many assume that they will have access 
to court regardless of what they sign. 
Given the depth of misunderstanding and the expectations of 
access to court our research uncovered, we believe that arguments about 
the efficacy of arbitration miss the mark.  Even if arbitration offers an 
unquestionably better process, if consumers are unable to make an 
informed decision by choosing it over litigation, then arbitration loses 
the legitimacy that is critical to procedural justice.242  Arguments about 
the efficacy of arbitration may provide good reason to encourage post-
dispute arbitration, but they do not answer the question of whether 
                                                          
cards/research-analysis/stacked_deck.pdf (finding statistical evidence of National Arbitra-
tion Forum bias in favor of companies with reoccurring arbitrations); Alderman, supra note 
239, at 1258. 
 241.  Even where outside observers conclude that an arbitration process is fair to the 
weaker party, the weaker party may not perceive it to be fair.  That was the finding of Barbara 
Black and Jill Gross in their research into participant perceptions of securities arbitration 
conducted through the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).  See Jill I. Gross 
& Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors’ Views 
of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 378 fig. 34 (2008).  Alt-
hough they both concluded that FINRA arbitration satisfied basic standards of procedural 
fairness at least as well as adjudication, large majorities of surveyed customers who had 
experienced both litigation and arbitration thought the arbitration process was unfair and 
expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome.  Id. at 353, 379. 
 242.  See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 278 (2004).  
In Solum’s words: 
[I]n the case of adjudication, as in the case of legislation, we regard legitimacy as 
a political good.  The goodness of legitimacy flows from an intuitively appealing 
principle of political morality: each citizen who is to be bound by an official pro-
ceeding for the resolution of a civil dispute should be able to regard the procedure 
as a legitimate source of binding authority creating a content independent obliga-
tion of political morality for the parties to the dispute. 
Id. 
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companies should be able to require consumers to sign pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements. 
Of course, the question of whether individual arbitration is 
superior to individual litigation ignores one of the central issues in the 
modern arbitration debate: class actions.  Companies use arbitration to 
divert claimants away from class litigation and into individual 
arbitration.  Some claim arbitration provides a superior forum for the 
resolution of small disputes than class action litigation.  For example, 
the Supreme Court in Concepcion asserted that an injured consumer 
might be better off with AT&T’s arbitration process than with 
membership in a class because a class action would likely take longer 
than an individual arbitration and result in an award to an individual 
consumer significantly less than the $7500 minimum award AT&T was 
obligated to pay if it lost at arbitration.243 
We express no opinion here about the efficacy of class actions, a 
subject of heated debate.  But we believe that, just as our research raises 
serious questions about the legitimacy of consumer agreement to 
arbitration, it also generates doubt about the legitimacy of the class 
action waivers contained in arbitration clauses.  Four times as many 
respondents believed that they could still participate in a class action 
after agreeing to a class action waiver than recognized that they could 
not.  Even when the question told respondents that they could not join 
a class action, less than 30% understood that they could not be included 
in a class action.  Again, we believe that evidence of arbitration’s 
efficacy cannot suffice to justify class waivers if those waivers rest on 
consent based on misconceptions. 
3. Disclosure and Opt-Outs as Protection for Consumer Rights 
A further possible response to our findings about consumer 
expectations regarding their process options is to advocate better 
disclosure of the existence, nature, and effect of arbitration agreements, 
perhaps backed by language allowing consumers to opt out of those 
agreements.  If consumers have mistaken impressions about the legal 
effect of the contracts they sign, this argument might suggest that the 
solution is to disabuse consumers of those notions and/or give them the 
ability to select different processes. 
We tested only one contract, and it is possible that the format 
and/or the language of the contract we tested could be modified in ways 
that would improve understanding, for example, by including dispute 
resolution terms in the Schumer Box.  But we think our results cast 
doubt on the utility of disclosures regardless of how they are presented. 
                                                          
 243.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2001). 
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First, in the sample contract we used, arbitration was arguably the 
most prominent term in the contract text, with more mentions than any 
other term and with a variety of formatting, including italics, bold, and 
ALLCAPS to call attention to it. Nevertheless, arbitration tied for the 
fourteenth most cited term in the question that asked respondents what 
they remembered about the agreement.  Arbitration was not even the 
most commonly remembered term among terms not already included in 
the Schumer Box.  One other term—involving cancellation—was noted 
more often than arbitration; another term—minimum payment—was 
cited as many times as arbitration.  Neither of those terms was 
highlighted to the same extent as arbitration.  Even when we 
specifically referred in our questions to common terms, such as those 
barring class actions, jury trials, and appeal, respondents did not 
recognize their effect.  In light of these findings, it seems unlikely that 
any amount of highlighting would succeed in making consumers aware 
of the rights they forego by agreeing to contracts providing for 
arbitration. 
Second, comparison of the answers of those who spent more time 
with the contract with those who spent less suggests that better 
disclosure would not solve the problem.  Theoretically, enhanced 
disclosure should result in consumers becoming more aware of the 
disclosed items, just as spending more time with the contract should 
result in respondents developing a similar awareness.  By comparing 
those two groups, we should arrive at a rough approximation of the 
effect greater disclosure would have.244  As to each of three 
categories—the amount of time spent on the entire contract, the amount 
of time spent on page six,245 and the amount of time spent on the first 
six pages of the contract—we compared the 25% of the respondents 
who spent the most time with the quarter who spent the least time.  In 
not one of the three categories was the difference in the percentage of 
wrong answers statistically significant, suggesting that greater 
disclosure would not reduce respondent misconceptions.246  
Respondents who spent more time did have a statistically significant 
increase in correct answers, at the .05 level.  But, as indicated in Figure 
20, in the Appendix, the mean percentage of correct answers among 
those who were in the top category of reading time in all three 
categories never reached as high as 30%.  Spending more time with the 
                                                          
 244.  While it is possible that respondents who spent more time with the contract did so 
because they read more slowly, we think it more plausible that they read with greater care. 
 245.  Page six contained the first part of the arbitration clause, including the italicized and 
capitalized portions that stated that consumers could not litigate in non-small claims courts, 
participate in class actions, or have jury trials. 
 246.  We used a t-test to measure significance for all the data discussed in this paragraph. 
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contract only marginally improved comprehension of the arbitration 
terms.  While we cannot definitively conclude that enhanced 
disclosures would have no effect—because we did not test alternative 
disclosures–our results suggest little reason for optimism about the 
efficacy of disclosures. 
Our findings also cast doubt on the utility of arbitration opt-outs, 
another possible method for protecting consumers from unduly 
burdensome arbitration agreements.  The CFPB arbitration study found 
that 27.3% of the arbitration clauses in the credit card contracts it 
studied included opt-out provisions, permitting card holders to opt out 
of arbitration of disputes arising at a later time if they submitted a signed 
writing, typically within thirty to sixty days of the opening of the 
account.247  We were not able to test in this survey consumer 
understanding of opt-out provisions in arbitration clauses.  But, as noted 
earlier, available evidence suggests that about one consumer in a 
thousand takes advantage of the opportunity to opt out of arbitration 
clauses.248 
From the information we were able to collect, we infer that opt-
out rates are low, for two reasons.  First, our study strongly suggests 
that consumers are not aware of the rights they waive in arbitration 
clauses.  It thus seems unlikely that they are aware of the rights included 
in arbitration clauses, such as the right to opt out.  If consumers do not 
know of their right to opt out, they are unlikely to assert it.  Second, 
even consumers who notice that the contract permits an arbitration opt-
out are unlikely to avail themselves of that option if they fail to 
appreciate that the arbitration clause strips them of any rights.  Many of 
the respondents seemed to believe arbitration supplements court 
litigation, rather than supplanting it.  Accordingly, it is difficult to see 
why consumers would bother to prepare and send a letter opting out of 
arbitration.249  But all of this is speculation on our part.  Credit card 
companies offering opt-outs undoubtedly know how many consumers 
have opted out.  We hope that they will make that information available. 
                                                          
 247.  See CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 31. 
 248.  See supra note 71. 
 249.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 183, at 43–44. 
[S]ome roundtable participants stated that, for a variety of reasons, consumers 
rarely exercise . . . opt-out rights.  Many consumer advocates asserted that, if con-
sumers were aware of that option, they would choose to do so.  In contrast, an 
attorney for creditors opined that few consumers would choose to opt out of arbi-
tration because they prefer it to court litigation. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider conclude their important 
book, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, by recalling how sixteenth-century Spaniards delivered a 
speech in Spanish to New World audiences that did not understand 
Spanish.250  The speech threatened war if the listeners failed to follow 
instructions, and as the listeners did not understand the speech, the 
recitation was largely a waste of time, with unfortunate results.251  So it 
may be with arbitration clauses.  Though the arbitration clause in our 
contract was written in English, it seems to have been little more 
effective than it would have been in a foreign language—or even 
nonsense. 
Sizable majorities of respondents did not understand that the 
contract they had been given: (a) required them to arbitrate; (b) deprived 
them of the right to a jury trial on a claim of $5,000; (c) prevented them 
participating in a class; and (d) would almost certainly be enforced by 
a court.  Leaving the sample contract aside, large majorities did not 
grasp that a “properly-worded” arbitration agreement foreclosing 
judicial process, waiving class relief, and providing that the arbitrator’s 
decision was final would be enforced by a court. And in their daily lives, 
only a small percentage correctly understood that they were already 
parties to at least one arbitration agreement. 
                                                          
 250.  BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 81, at 195. 
 251.  See LEWIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF 
AMERICA 33 (1949).  Hanke writes: 
  Spaniards themselves, when describing this document, called “the Require-
ment,” have often shared the dilemma of Las Casas, who confessed on reading it 
he could not decide whether to laugh or to weep.  He roundly denounced it on 
practical as well as theoretical grounds, pointing out the manifest injustice of the 
whole business.  Others found it infinitely ridiculous and even its author, Palacios 
Rubios, “laughed often” when Oviedo recounted his own experiences and in-
stances of how some captains had put the Requirement into practice, though the 
learned doctor still believed that it satisfied the demands of the Christian con-
science when executed in the manner originally intended. 
A later passage from the same volume describes how presentation of the “disclosure” 
evolved: 
[T]he Requirement was read to trees and empty huts when no Indians were to be 
found.  Captains muttered its theological phrases into their beards on the edge of 
sleeping Indian settlements, or even a league away before starting the formal at-
tack, and at times some leather-lunged Spanish notary hurled its sonorous phrases 
after the Indians as they fled into the mountains.  Once it was read in camp before 
the soldiers to the beat of the drum.  Ship captains would sometimes have the 
document read from the deck as they approached an island . . . . 
Id. at 34. 
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As the Supreme Court has noted, arbitration must be a creature of 
consent.252  But our study raises serious questions about whether the 
consent consumers provide when they enter into a contract containing 
an arbitration clause is a knowing consent, and therefore whether it 
should be considered consent at all.  Those questions justify, at a 
minimum, greater congressional, regulatory, and judicial scrutiny of 
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts. 
  
                                                          
 252.  See supra note 2. 
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APPENDIX 
SURVEY 
Q1: St. John’s University School of Law is conducting a survey into 
consumer understanding of contract terms.  Thank you so much for tak-
ing the time to participate in this research.  First, we are going to show 
you a consumer contract. Then we will ask you some questions about 
consumer contracts, including contracts you might already have agreed 
to in your everyday life.[We are still perfecting the survey, so if you see 
anything that confuses you or you don’t understand, please indicate that 
in the places for comments.]253  If you need to make the print size big-
ger, please use your browser’s controls to do so (in Explorer, click 
“View” and then use “Zoom” to make your selection). 
Before we can ask you the questions, we are required to show you 
a consent form and ask you to read it and click on the box that says you 
are willing to answer our questions. 
By clicking “Yes” below, you agree to participate in this survey of 
your own free will.  You may refuse to participate or withdraw at any 
time.  If at any time you decide not to participate, you will not be pe-
nalized in any way, except that you will not get paid for your time. You 
have the right to skip a question.  You have a right not to answer any 
question you prefer not to answer.  There are no known risks associated 
with your participation in this research beyond the risks of everyday 
life.  There are two benefits you will receive if you complete the survey.  
First, [if you have a PayPal account and tell us the associated email 
address, we will deposit $5 into the account]254 (you will receive the 
promised benefit after you complete the survey). Second, your answers 
may help consumers and researchers.  Your identity will remain confi-
dential.  We will not make public your participation. 
Is there anything about the study or your participation in it that is 
unclear or you do not understand?  If so, please contact Professor Jeff 
Sovern at [phone number redacted] or [email address redacted] or 
through St. John’s University at 8000 Utopia Parkway, Jamaica, New 
York, 11349.  If you have any questions about your rights as a research 
participant, please contact the University’s Human Subjects Review 
Board, [phone number redacted]. 
 
                                                          
 253.  The bracketed sentence appeared only during the first two phases of the survey ad-
ministration. 
 254.  The bracketed sentence appeared only during the first phase of the survey admin-
istration while the portion of the sentence in parentheses did not appear during that phase. 
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Do you consent to answer the questions? 
 
○Yes 
 
 Imagine that you obtained a credit card and the credit card com-
pany has provided you with the credit card contract we are about to 
show you, perhaps online or through the mail.  If you have a credit card, 
you have been given a contract like this for your credit card in the past.  
Some consumers read contracts like this while others may not, and still 
others may read some parts and not other parts.  Please give this contract 
the exact same amount of attention you would if it had just been pro-
vided to you, along with your new credit card.  This is not a test. Rather, 
we want to learn what you and other consumers take away from con-
sumer contracts in your everyday life.  After you are finished with each 
page, please click the arrow at the bottom right of the survey to move 
forward.255 
 
                                                          
 255.  Because of formatting issues involved in converting the contract from an online 
survey instrument to a Word document, the contract on the following pages is in slightly 
smaller text and slightly less clear than it was in the survey instrument when the survey was 
not zoomed in (i.e., when it was viewed at 100%). 
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When you are finished with this page, please click the arrow at the bot-
tom right of the survey to move on to the survey questions. 
 
 
Q2: The credit card contract you just saw said many things.  We would 
like to know what you remember.  Please put down a word or 
phrase for five items you recall.  You do not need to repeat the 
actual words.  For example, if you remember seeing the annual 
fee term, you can simply write “annual fee.”  If you don’t remem-
ber five items, please mention as many or as few as you do re-
member.256 
 
Q3: How much of the contract did you read and understand? 
 
○All of the contract. 
○Most of the contract. 
○Some of the contract. 
○Very little or none of the contract.  
                                                          
 256.  In the version of the survey given to the Qualtrics respondents, the demographics 
questions (Q 29-30, Q35-39 appeared at this point, and the remaining questions appeared 
after the demographic questions. 
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Q4: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Q5: Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized the credit 
card company overcharged you.  The credit card company, how-
ever, believes it has not overcharged you and refuses to give you 
your money back.  Under the terms of the contract you just saw, 
would you have the right to sue the credit card company in small 
claims court? 
 
○Yes 
○No 
○I don’t know. 
 
Q6: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Q7: Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized the credit 
card company overcharged you.  The credit card company, how-
ever, believes it has not overcharged you and refuses to give you 
your money back.  The dispute is too large to be decided by a 
small claims court.  Under the terms of the contract you just saw, 
if the amount of the dispute was large enough, would you have a 
right to have a court decide the dispute even if the credit card 
company didn’t want a court to decide the dispute? 
 
○Yes 
○No 
○I don’t know 
 
Q8: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Q9: Suppose after you use the credit card, the credit card company says 
you owe them more than you think you owe them.  Suppose also 
you refuse to pay the amount they say you owe, and they bring a 
claim against you to collect that amount.  Assume the dispute is 
too large to be decided by a small claims court.  Under the terms 
of the contract you just saw, would you have a right to a jury trial 
if the amount was large enough? 
 
 ○Yes 
 ○No 
 ○I don’t know  
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Q10: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Q11: If you and the credit card company have a dispute that is too large 
to be brought in a small claims court, did the contract you just 
saw say you have agreed to arbitrate it? 
 
 ○Yes 
 ○No 
 ○I don’t know 
 
Q12: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Q13: Suppose that you and many other consumers had the same kind 
of dispute with the credit card company. Under the terms of the 
contract you just saw, could you be included with the other con-
sumers in a single lawsuit (that is, a class action) against the credit 
card company? 
 
 ○Yes 
 ○No 
 ○I don’t know. 
 
Q14: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Q15: Before you use a credit card, the company should provide you 
with a contract like the one you just saw.  If the contract is the 
same length as the one you just saw, we would like to know how 
much time you would spend reading it.  Which of the following 
is true? 
 
 ○I would probably not read the contract. 
 ○I would probably spend a minute or less reading the contract. 
 ○I would probably spend more than one minute but no more 
than three minutes reading the contract. 
 ○I would probably spend more than three minutes reading the 
contract. 
 ○I don’t know. 
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Q16: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Q17: We will now ask you some general questions about your own un-
derstanding and personal preferences about consumer contracts.  
Before entering into a contract, do you look to see if the contract 
says you have to arbitrate any disputes and can’t sue the com-
pany? 
 
 ○Yes 
 ○No 
 ○Sometimes 
 
Q18: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Q19: Suppose you agreed to a credit card contract that included a 
properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had 
a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could 
be resolved only in arbitration.  You think the credit card com-
pany has overcharged you by $5,000, but the company disa-
grees.  How likely do you think it is that a court would throw out 
the arbitration clause and decide your dispute? 
 
 ○Very Likely 
 ○Likely 
 ○Unlikely 
 ○Very Unlikely 
 ○I don’t know. 
 
Q20: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Q21: Suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that included a 
properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had 
a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could 
be resolved only in arbitration and the arbitrator’s decision is 
final.  Just as in the last question, you think the credit card com-
pany has overcharged you by $5,000, but the company disa-
grees.  Assume also you brought an arbitration proceeding 
against the company and the arbitrator decided against you and 
ruled you had to pay the $5,000.  Assume that the arbitrator had 
unintentionally made a mistake about the law and so ruled 
against you, but that otherwise had conducted the arbitration 
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properly.  Which of the following options would be available to 
you? 
 
 ○Nothing.  I would still have to pay the money. 
 ○I could ignore what the arbitrator said and not pay. 
 ○I could appeal to another arbitrator or arbitrators. 
 ○I could ignore the arbitrator and start all over again in court. 
 ○I don’t know. 
 
Q22: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Q23: Again, suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that in-
cluded a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the com-
pany had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that dis-
putes could be resolved only in arbitration.  You think the credit 
card company has overcharged you.  Many other consumers 
have a similar dispute against the credit card company.  The 
company says it has not overcharged anyone.  Suppose the con-
tract said you could not join with other consumers to bring a 
class action. Could you be included in a class action against the 
credit card company, either in court or arbitration or both? 
 
 ○Yes 
 ○No 
 ○I don’t know. 
 
Q24: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Q25: We appreciate you taking the time to complete this survey. We 
would like to ask you some questions about you.  Have you ever 
entered into a consumer contract with any company that said you 
have to arbitrate any disputes and can’t sue the company? 
 
 ○Yes 
 ○No 
 ○I don’t know. 
 
Q26: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
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Q27: Please click the box for any of the following statements that are 
true: 
 
 □I have a cell phone from Verizon Wireless, AT&T Mobility, 
or Sprint on which I am the primary person on the account and 
signed the contract (as opposed to being an authorized user on 
somebody else’s cell phone account, as some people arrange for 
family members). 
 □I have a PayPal account. 
 □I have an iTunes account. 
 □I have a Skype account. 
 
Q28: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Q29: Which is the highest level of education you have attained? 
 
 ○Did not graduate from high school. 
 ○High school graduate or GED. 
 ○Some college or post-secondary work. 
 ○College graduate. 
 ○Post-graduate work. 
 
Q30: If you wish to say more about your last answer, you may do so 
here: 
 
Q31: Do you work or in the last five years have you worked for a bank, 
credit union, savings and loan or cell phone company? 
 
 □Yes, a bank, credit union, or savings and loan 
 □Yes, a cell phone company. 
 □No 
 
Q32:  If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Q33: Are you an attorney or law student? 
 
 ○Yes 
 ○No 
 
Q34: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
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Q35: Please tell us your age. 
 
Q36: Which racial or ethnic group in this list best describes you? You 
can select more than one. There are eight choices: 
 
 □White (including Middle Eastern or Arab) 
 □Black/African-American 
 □Hispanic/Latino/a 
 □Asian 
 □American Indian/Alaska Native 
 □Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander 
 □Other 
 □Prefer not to answer. 
 
Q37: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Q38: We will now ask about your total annual household income. 
There are six choices: 
 
 □Less than $24,000. 
 □At least $24,000 but less than $51,000. 
 □At least $51,000 but less than $81,000. 
 □At least $81,000 but less than $144,000. 
 □At least $144,000. 
 □Prefer not to answer. 
 
Q39: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Q40: Have you ever been a party to or otherwise involved in an arbi-
tration? 
 
 ○Yes 
 ○No 
 ○I don’t know 
 
Q41: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here: 
 
Thank you again for your help in this project. 
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METHODOLOGY: 
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON OF SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 
COMPARED TO BROADER U.S. POPULATION - ETHNICITY 
 
FIGURE 1257   
Ethnicity 
Survey  
Participants 
U.S. Adult 
Population 
White 68% 77.7% 
Black/African-American 13.5% 13.2% 
Hispanic/Latino 16% 17.1% 
Asian 8.5% 5.3% 
American Indian/Alaskan 1.8% 1.2% 
Native Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander 0.3% 0.2% 
Other 2.4% 0 
 
 
  
                                                          
 257.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS, http://quickfacts.cen-
sus.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited June 27, 2015). 
When comparing the demographics of U.S. citizens old enough to qualify for credit cards to 
those of the participants in our survey for age, ethnicity, income, and level of education, we 
find that the participants in our survey are highly representative of the American adult pop-
ulation.  For example, according to the U.S. Census data, 77.7% of the U.S. population iden-
tifies as White compared to 68% of the participants in our study.  13.2% of the U.S. popula-
tion identifies as Black/African-American compared to 13.5% of the participants in our 
study.  17.1% of the U.S. population identifies as Hispanic/Latino compared to 16% of the 
participants in our study.  5.3% of the U.S. population identifies as Asian compared to 8.5% 
of the participants in our study.  1.2% of the U.S. population identifies as American In-
dian/Alaskan compared to 1.8% of the participants in our study.  Finally, 0.2% of the U.S. 
population identifies as Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander compared to 0.3% of the partici-
pants in our study.  Of particular mention, 2.4% of the participants in our study identified as 
“Other,” while the U.S. Census does not provide data for this category.  Because some people 
identify as more than one ethnicity, the percentages exceed 100%. 
68
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METHODOLOGY: 
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON OF SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 
COMPARED TO BROADER U.S. POPULATION - AGE 
 
FIGURE 2258   
Age Survey  
Participants 
U.S. Adult 
Population 
18 to 20 years 5.2% 4.1% 
21 to 44 years 37.1% 31.9% 
45 to 64 years 40.9% 26.5% 
65 years and over 16.8% 13.4% 
 
 
  
                                                          
 258.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
2012, http://www.census.gov/population/age/data/2012comp.html (last visited July 24, 
2014). 
In assessing age, the U.S. Census reports that for those U.S. citizens old enough to 
qualify for credit cards, 4.1% are 18 to 20 years old, while in our study 5.2% of the partici-
pants were 18 to 20 years old.  Further, 31.9% of U.S. citizens old enough to qualify for 
credit cards are 21 to 44 years old, while 37.1% of the participants in our study were 21 to 
44 years old. 26.5% of U.S. citizens old enough to qualify for credit cards are 45 to 64 years 
old, while 40.9% of the participants in our survey were within this age range.  Finally, 13.4% 
of U.S. citizens old enough to qualify for a credit card are 65 years old and over, while 16.8% 
of the participants in our survey were 65 years old and over. 
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DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON OF SURVEY 
PARTICIPANTS COMPARED TO BROADER 
U.S. POPULATION – INCOME 
 
 
  
                                                          
 259.  See CRAIG K. ELWELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20811, THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND THE MIDDLE CLASS 2 (2014), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20811.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2015). 
Next, when testing for income, 24.3% of the American adult population reports making less 
than $25,000 a year, while 27.1% of the participants in our survey reported reports making 
less than $24,000 a year.  Additionally, 24.3% of the American adult population reports 
making at least $25,000 but less than $50,000 a year, while 27.1% of the participants in our 
survey reported making at least $24,000 but less than $51,000 a year.  20.3% of the American 
adult population report making at least $50,000, but less than $80,000 a year, while 22.2% 
of the participants in our survey reported making at least $51,000, but less than $81,000 a 
year.  21.3% of the American adult population reports making at least $80,000, but less than 
$150,000 a year, while 17.4% of the participants in our survey reported making at least 
$81,000, but less than $144,000 a year.  Finally, 9.5% of the American adult population 
reports making at least $150,000 a year, while 6.2% of the participants in our survey reported 
making at least $144,000 a year. 
FIGURE 3259 
  
Income  
Survey Participants    
Less than $24,000 27.1% 
At least $24,000 but less than $51,000 27.1% 
At least $51,000 but less than $81,000 22.2% 
At least $81,000 but less than $144,000 17.4% 
At least $144,000  6.2% 
  
U.S. Adult Population     
Less than $25,000 24.3% 
At least $25,000, but less than $50,000 24.3% 
At least $50,000, but less than $80,000 20.3% 
At least $80,000, but less than $150,000 21.3% 
At least $150,000  9.5% 
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U.S. POPULATION – LEVEL OF EDUCATION 
 
                                                          
 260.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 
2013 – DETAILED TABLES, http:/www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/educa-
tion/data/cps/2013/tables.html (last visited July 24, 2014). 
Lastly, when examining the highest level of education achieved, the U.S. Census finds 
that 12.6% of the U.S. population over the age of 18 years old  did not graduate from high 
school compared to 11.4% of the participants in our survey.  29.5% of the U.S. population 
reports having graduated from high school, or getting a GED, compared to 30.1% of the 
participants in our survey.  29% of the U.S. population reports having done some college or 
post-secondary work compared to 29.1% of the participants in our study.  18.7% of the U.S. 
population reports having graduated from college compared to 19.3% of the participants in 
our study.  Finally, 10.2% of the U.S. population reports having done some post-graduate 
work compared to 10.1% of the participants in our study. 
FIGURE 4260   
Level of Education 
Survey  
Participants 
U.S. Adult 
Population 
Did not graduate from high 
school 11.4% 12.6% 
High school graduate or 
GED 30.1% 29.5% 
Some college or post-sec-
ondary work 29.1% 29% 
College graduate 19.3% 18.7% 
Post-graduate work 10.1% 10.2% 
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION: 
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How Much Time Did The Survey Participants Typically Spend Read-
ing Similar Contracts? 
 
FIGURE 6 
Before you use a credit card, the company should provide you with a 
contract like the one you just saw.  If the contract is the same length as 
the one you just saw, we would like to know how much time you would 
spend reading it.  Which of the following is true? 
1 I would probably not 
read the contract. 
Would not 
read 
9% 58 
2 I would probably spend 
a minute or less reading 
the contract. 
A minute or 
less 
19% 127 
3 I would probably spend 
more than one minute 
but no more than three 
minutes reading the 
contract. 
1 - 3 minutes 28% 187 
4 I would probably spend 
more than three minutes 
reading the contract. 
3+ minutes 40% 269 
5 I don’t know. I don’t know. 4% 27 
 Total Total 100% 668 
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Q15: How much time would you spend reading the 
contract? (N=668)
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CONSUMER RECALL OF CONTRACT TERMS: 
Which Items Did Survey Participants Mention They Recalled After 
They Read The Contract? 
 
FIGURE 7a 
Top 20 Items Survey Respondents Mentioned Recalling from Their 
Sample Contract 
 TOTAL TERMS 
1 487 Interest Rates (Unspecified) 
2 346 Annual Fee 
3 147 Late Fee 
4 88 Travel Fee 
5 43 Unspecified Fee(s) 
6 33 Cash Advance Fee (Unspecified) 
7 32 Balance Transfer Fee 
8 30 Overlimit Fee 
9 26 Cancellation  
10 24 ATM Fee 
11 24 Balance Transfer 
12 24 Overdraft Fee 
13 23 Foreign Fee 
14 23 Minimum Payment 
15 21 Billing Rights 
16 18 Arbitration * 
17 17 Credit Limit 
18 16 Cash Advance 
19 16 Convenience Checks 
20 16 Lost/Stolen Card 
* Only 18 respondents explicitly referred to arbitration, though five 
other cited items that seem drawn from the arbitration, clause: “class 
action info,”  “you or we can’t go to jury or trial,” “federal court 
decision for disputes,”  “You do not have a right as a representa-
tive...,” and “JAMS as a contact.”  
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CONSUMER RECALL OF CONTRACT TERMS: 
Which Items Did Survey Participants Mention They Recalled After 
They Read The Contract? 
 
FIGURE 7b 
 
Top 20 Items Survey Respondents Mentioned Recalling from Their 
Sample Contract 
 
 
* Only 18 respondents explicitly referred to arbitration, though five 
other cited items that seem drawn from the arbitration, clause: “class 
action info,”  “you or we can’t go to jury or trial,” “federal court deci-
sion for disputes,”  “You do not have a right as a representative...,” and 
“JAMS as a contact.” 
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONTRACTS: 
Do Survey Participants Understand That They Have Entered Into An 
Arbitration Contract? 
 
FIGURE 8 
 
Q11: If you and the credit card company have a dispute that is too 
large to be brought in a small claims court, did the contract you 
just saw say you have agreed to arbitrate it? 
 
 
 
 
 
  
42.7%
8.5%
48.8%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Yes No I don't know
Q11: If you and the credit card company have a dispute 
that is too large to be brought in a small claims 
court, did the contract you just saw say you have             
agreed to arbitrate it?
1 Yes 42.7% 285 
2 No 8.5% 57 
3 I don’t know 48.8% 326 
 Total 100% 668 
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SAMPLE CONTRACT: 
Do Survey Participants Understand That Under the Sample Con-
tract, They Are Precluded From Court Adjudication? 
 
FIGURE 9 
 
Q7: Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized the credit 
card company overcharged you.  The credit card company, how-
ever, believes it has not overcharged you and refuses to give you 
your money back. The dispute is too large to be decided by a small 
claims court.  Under the terms of the contract you just saw, if the 
amount of the dispute was large enough, would you have a right 
to have a court decide the dispute even if the credit card company 
didn’t want a court to decide the dispute? 
 
1 Yes 49% 326 
2 No 14% 91 
3 I don’t know 37% 250 
 Total 100% 667 
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Q7:  Would you have a right to have a court decide the 
dispute? (N = 667)
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SAMPLE CONTRACT: 
Do Survey Participants Understand That They Still Have A Right To 
Litigate Their Claim In Small Claims Court? 
 
FIGURE 10 
 
Q5: Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized the credit 
card company overcharged you. The credit card company, how-
ever, believes it has not overcharged you and refuses to give you 
your money back. Under the terms of the contract you just saw, 
would you have the right to sue the credit card company in small 
claims court? 
 
1 Yes 28% 184 
2 No 30% 200 
3 I don’t know 42% 283 
 Total 100% 667 
 
 
  
28%
30%
42%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Yes No I don't know
Q5: Would you have the right to sue the credit card    
company in small claims court? (N = 667)
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION UNDER 
THE SAMPLE CONTRACT: 
Do Survey Participants Understand They Have  
Waived The Right To A Jury Trial? 
 
FIGURE 11 
 
Q9: Suppose after you use the credit card, the credit card company says 
you owe them more than you think you owe them. Suppose also 
you refuse to pay the amount they say you owe, and they bring a 
claim against you to collect that amount. Assume the dispute is too 
large to be decided by a small claims court.  Under the terms of 
the contract you just saw, would you have a right to a jury trial if 
the amount was large enough? 
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Q9: Would you have a right to a jury trial if the amount
was large enough? (N = 667)
1 Yes 34% 229 
2 No 18% 121 
3 I don’t know 48% 317 
 Total 100% 667 
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SAMPLE CONTRACT: 
Do Survey Participants Understand They Have Waived The Right To 
Participate In A Class Action Suit? 
 
FIGURE 12 
 
Q13: Suppose that you and many other consumers had the same kind 
of dispute with the credit card company.  Under the terms of the 
contract you just saw, could you be included with the other con-
sumers in a single lawsuit (that is, a class action) against the credit 
card company? 
 
1 Yes 48% 316 
2 No 12% 77 
3 I don’t know 41% 272 
 Total 100% 665 
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Q13: Could you be included in a class action against    
the credit card company? (N = 665)
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION 
IN HYPOTHETICAL CONSUMER CONTRACT: 
Do Survey Participants Understand That Arbitration Clauses Are En-
forceable? 
 
FIGURE 13 
 
Q19: Suppose you agreed to a credit card contract that included a 
properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had 
a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could 
be resolved only in arbitration. You think the credit card com-
pany has overcharged you by $5,000, but the company disa-
grees. How likely do you think it is that a court would throw out 
the arbitration clause and decide your dispute? 
 
 
  
Answer Response % Combined % 
Very Likely 63 9.43% 
32% 
Likely 149 22.31% 
Unlikely 177 26.50% 
43% 
Very Unlikely 109 16.32% 
I don’t know. 170 25.45% 25% 
Total 688 100.00% 100% 
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I don't know
Q19: How likely would a court throw out the arbitration  
clause and decide your dispute? (N = 668)
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION IN 
HYPOTHETICAL CONSUMER CONTRACT: 
Do Survey Participants Understand That They Have Waived 
Their Right To Participate In A Class Action? 
 
FIGURE 14 
 
Q23: Again, suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that in-
cluded a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the com-
pany had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that dis-
putes could be resolved only in arbitration. You think the credit 
card company has overcharged you. Many other consumers have 
a similar dispute against the credit card company. The company 
says it has not overcharged anyone. Suppose the contract said you 
could not join with other consumers to bring a class action. Could 
you be included in a class action against the credit card company, 
either in court or arbitration or both? 
 
1 Yes 36.5% 243 
2 No 28.9% 192 
3 I don’t know 34.6% 230 
 Total 100% 665 
 
  
36.5%
28.9%
34.6%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Yes No I don't know
Q23: Could you be included in a class action against 
the credit card company, either in court or 
arbitration or both? (N = 665)
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION IN 
HYPOTHETICAL CONSUMER CONTRACT: 
Do Survey Participants Understand That An Arbitrator’s Decision is 
Final? 
FIGURE 15 
Q21: Suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that included a 
properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had 
a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could 
be resolved only in arbitration and the arbitrator’s decision is fi-
nal. Just as in the last question, you think the credit card company 
has overcharged you by $5,000, but the company disagrees. As-
sume also you brought an arbitration proceeding against the com-
pany and the arbitrator decided against you and ruled you had to 
pay the $5,000.  Assume that the arbitrator had unintentionally 
made a mistake about the law and so ruled against you, but that 
otherwise had conducted the arbitration properly.  Which of the 
following options would be available to you? 
 
1 Nothing, still have to pay 17.4% 116 
2 Ignore the arbitrator and not pay 3.0% 20 
3 Appeal to other arbitrators 42.5% 283 
4 Ignore the arbitrator and start again in court 9.6% 64 
5 I don’t know 27.5% 183 
 Total 100% 668 
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Q21: Which of the following options would be available to 
you regarding the court ruling against you? (N = 668)
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CONSUMERS’ AWARENESS OF THEIR OWN CONSUMERS 
CONTRACTS: 
Which Consumer Contracts Have You Entered Into? 
Which of Those Contracts Have an Arbitration Clause? 
 
FIGURE 16 
Table 2. Cross Tabulation: Q27 (Do you have any of the accounts 
listed below?) and Q25 (Have you ever entered into a consumer con-
tract with arbitration terms) 
 
 Q25. Have you ever 
entered into a con-
sumer contract with 
arbitration terms? Total 
Yes No 
I do not 
know 
Q27. Do 
you have 
any of the 
accounts 
listed be-
low? 
Have an ac-
count with one 
or more of 
Skype, PayPal, 
Verizon Wire-
less, AT&T 
Mobility, or 
Sprint. 
Count 95 264 218 577 
% 
within 
Q27. 
16% 46% 38% 100% 
% 
within  
Q25. 
94% 87% 89% 89% 
Do not have an 
account with 
an arbitration 
clause. 
Count 6 39 26 71 
% 
within 
Q27. 
8% 55% 37% 100% 
% 
within  
Q25. 
6% 13% 11% 11% 
Total 
Count 101 303 244 648 
% 
within 
Q27. 
16% 47% 38% 100% 
% 
within  
Q25. 
100
% 
100
% 
100% 100% 
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION: 
What Are The Characteristics That Correlate With Survey Participants’ 
Correct Responses About The Sample Contract? 
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FIGURE 18a 
 
How much of the contract did you read and understand? 
 
1 All of the contract. 6% 37 
2 Most of the contract. 24% 163 
3 Some of the contract. 44% 294 
4 Very little or none of the contract. 26% 174 
 Total 100% 668 
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Q3:  How much of the contract did you read and 
understand? (N = 668)
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FIGURE 18b 
 
Correct Scores 
Total correct, incorrect, and “I don’t know” answers to the eight ques-
tions 
 
1 Correct Answers (N=1352) 25% 1352 
2 Incorrect Answers (N=1950) 37% 1950 
3 I don’t know (N=2031) 38% 2031 
 Total 100% 5333 
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Figure 18c. Total correct, incorrect, and "I don't know"
answers to the eight questions? (N = 5,333)
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION: 
How Many Questions Did Survey Participants Answer Correctly? 
 
FIGURE 19a 
 
Correlation Between Correct Scores And Reported Understanding 
 
Average percent of correct answers to the 8 questions: By Q3 
(The 8 questions are: Q16, Q19, Q22, Q25, Q28, Q37, Q40, and Q43) 
 
 
Q3. How much of the contract did you 
read and understand? 
% of correct an-
swers 
4 Very little or none of the contract. 19% 
3 Some of the contract. 26% 
2 Most of the contract. 30% 
1 All of the contract. 28% 
 Total average 25% 
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how much of the contract that respondents claimed to 
read and understand (N=668)
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION: 
How Many Questions Did Survey Participants Answer Incorrectly? 
 
FIGURE 19b 
 
Correlation Between Incorrect Scores And Reported Understanding 
 
Average percent of incorrect answers to the 8 questions: By Q3 
(The 8 questions are: Q16, Q19, Q22, Q25, Q28, Q37, Q40, and Q43) 
 
Q3. How much of the contract did you read and 
understand? 
% of incorrect an-
swers 
Very little or none of the contract. 26% 
Some of the contract. 36% 
Most of the contract. 44% 
All of the contract. 57% 
Total average 37% 
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read and understand (N=668)
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION: 
How Does The Time Spent On The Contract Correlate With The Per-
centage Of Correct Answers To Survey Questions? 
 
FIGURE 20  T-test: Comparing average percent of correct answers 
to the 8 questions (The 8 questions are: Q5, Q7, Q9, Q11, Q13, Q19, 
Q21, and Q23) 
 
Note: 
 
This table presents the results of the t-test that compares the aver-
age percents of correct answers to the 8 questions between the top and 
bottom quarters of survey participants spending time reading pages  
1–7, pages 1–6, and page 6 of the contract. 
 
Section 1 indicates that the average percent of correct answers by 
the top quarter spending time reading pages 1– 7 was significantly 
higher than the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter (28% 
vs. 22%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.29). 
 
Section 2 reveals that the average percent of correct answers by 
the top quarter spending time reading pages 1–6 was significantly 
higher than the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter (29% 
vs. 22%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.35). 
 
Section 3 demonstrates that the average percent of correct answers 
by the top quarter spending time reading page 6 was significantly higher 
than the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter (29% vs. 23%) 
at the .05 level (effect size = 0.31). 
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Section 1: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending time 
reading pages 1–7 of the contract 
 
Group Statistics 
Time spent reading pages 1 – 7 of the 
contract N Mean 
Std. Devia-
tion 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Percent of 
correct an-
swers 
Bottom quarter: spend-
ing 66 seconds or less 
reading pages 1 – 7 
156 .2220 .18653 .01493 
Top quarter: spending 
280 seconds or more 
reading pages 1 – 7 
157 .2757 .21027 .01678 
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CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION: 
How Does The Time Spent On The Consumer Contract Correlate With 
The Survey Participants’ Correct Responses About The Sample Con-
tract? 
 
Section 2: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending time 
reading pages 1– 6 of the contract 
Group Statistics 
Time spent reading pages 1 – 6 
of the contract N Mean 
Std. Devia-
tion 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Percent of 
correct an-
swers 
Bottom quarter: 
spending 25 sec-
onds or less 
reading pages  
1– 6 
156 .2244 .19402 .01553 
Top quarter: 
spending 138 
seconds or more 
reading pages  
1– 6 
156 .2919 .21406 .01714 
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Section 3: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending time 
reading page 6 of the contract 
 
Group Statistics 
Time spent reading page 6 
of the contract N Mean 
Std. Devi-
ation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Percent of 
correct an-
swers 
Bottom 
quarter: 
spending 4 
seconds or 
less reading 
page 6 
166 .2252 .19811 .01538 
Top quarter: 
spending 17 
seconds or 
more read-
ing page 6 
164 .2868 .20581 .01607 
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T-test: Comparing average percent of incorrect answers to the 8 
questions 
 
(The 8 questions are: Q5, Q7, Q9, Q11, Q13, Q19, Q21, and Q23) 
 
Note: 
 
This table presents the results of the t-test that compares the 
average percents of incorrect answers to the 8 questions between the top 
and bottom quarters of survey participants spending time reading pages 
1–7, pages 1–6, and page 6 of the contract. Sections 1 to 3 indicate 
that there was no difference in the average percents of incorrect answers 
between the top and bottom quarters spending time reading pages 1 - 7, 
pages 1–6, and page 6 of the contract. 
Section 1: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending 
time reading pages 1–7 of the contract. 
 
Group Statistics 
Time spent reading pages  
1–7 of the contract N Mean Std. Deviation 
Percent of 
incorrect 
answers 
Bottom 
quarter: 
spending 66 
seconds or 
less reading 
pages 1–7 
156 .3574 .26619 
Top quarter: 
spending 
280 seconds 
or more 
reading 
pages 1–7 
157 .3525 .22273 
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Section 2: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending time 
reading pages 1 - 6 of the contract. 
 
Group Statistics 
Time spent reading pages 1– 6 of the 
contract N Mean Std. Deviation 
Percent 
of incor-
rect an-
swers 
Bottom quarter: spending 
25 seconds or less reading 
pages 1– 6 
156 .3534 .25446 
Top quarter: spending 138 
seconds or more reading 
pages 1– 6 
156 .3555 .22193 
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Section 3: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending 
time reading page 6 of the contract 
 
Group Statistics 
Time spent reading page 6 of the con-
tract N Mean Std. Deviation 
Percent 
of in-
correct 
answers 
Bottom quarter: spending 
4 seconds or less reading 
page 6 
166 .3622 .24255 
Top quarter: spending 17 
seconds or more reading 
page 6 
164 .3611 .22589 
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